Paul C. Burke v. Honorable Leslie Lewis : Reply Brief of Real Party in Interest The Doctor\u27s Company by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Paul C. Burke v. Honorable Leslie Lewis : Reply
Brief of Real Party in Interest The Doctor's
Company
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent M. Johnson; attorney for respondent.
Paul C. Burke; pro se.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Burke v. Lewis, No. 20040500 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5042
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAUL C. BURKE, 
j> . - . • 
oner, 
- vs -
HONOR AJBI ,EI ESI IE I E WIS, 
Respondent. 
MIL DOCTORS1 COMPAiW . (i GREGORY 
>RhZCiA, M.D., and HEIDI JUDD. persons" 
and as the natural parent and guardian of 
ATH AN MONTGOMERY, for and on behalf 
of AT1IAN MONTGOMER Y, 
Real Parties in Interest. 
Supi emeCom t l \h » 200 40500 SC 
Triiii f ' ml C'IRPNO <><)0<>IM c') ' 
f Y BRIEi H i EKES1 THE DOC I ( ^ COMPAIN \ 
« , . , ,„. . .„: : , \ i i aorumary v>ruioine miru judicial uisirici t o . . 
ki4iit Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Leslie Lewis Presiding 
Bradkv i L 1'arhL-
.ianics lvV. McConkie 
Jonathan l *.:r/ 
Parkei & McConkie 
I "\> hast 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-? ^ "r 
Attorney* for Heidi dudd 
Brent \L Johnson 
Administrative Offk t- ^ Mhe C* . • -
450 South State Street, Suite N31 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841! ' 
Attorney for Ho'i-^'fd^le '.rv- • .- -
Paul C. Burke 
Ray, Quinncy & Xeheker 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorney Appointed by ( out i <)rder 
to Represent (i (V/viwr D*'eziru 
?ar- : i. Reneher, /<490.; 
Vaun B. Hall, #7393 
hpinT: i.-i y Reneher, PC 
hffh 1 '«MI ; randall Building 
10 West 100 Sou tl 
Si lit I ,ake City, I;tan Mit-
Attorneys for The Doe to* 
UTA/J SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
i>OCUMEN1 
BRIEF 
ill B • 
DOCKET HO.£0W hsnn -SC 
Ft! ED 
0F.C 1 8 MM 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAUL C. BURKE, 
Petitioner, 
- vs -
HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS, 
Respondent. 
THE DOCTORS' COMPANY; G. GREGORY 
DREZGA, M.D., and HEIDI JUDD, personally 
and as the natural parent and guardian of 
ATHAN MONTGOMERY, for and on behalf 
of ATHAN MONTGOMERY, 
Real Parties in Interest. 
Supreme Court No. 20040500-SC 
Trial Court Case No. 990904527 
REPLY BRIEF OF REAL PARTY IN INTEREST THE DOCTORS' COMPANY 
On Petition for Extraordinary Writ to the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Leslie Lewis Presiding 
Bradley H. Parker 
James W. McConkie 
Jonathan T. Tichy 
Parker & McConkie 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2357 
Attorneys for Heidi Judd 
Brent M. Johnson 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
450 South State Street, Suite N31 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Paul C. Burke 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorney Appointed by Court Order 
to Represent G. Gregory Drezga 
Jaryl L. Rencher, #4903 
Vaun B. Hall, #7393 
Epperson & Rencher, PC 
Fifth Floor Crandall Building 
10 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for The Doctors' Company 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 
TDC'S RESPONSES TO JUDD'S STATEMENT OF 
FACTS 2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS AUTHORITY TO 
APPOINT COUNSEL FOR DREZGA AND COMPEL 
TDC TO PAY FOR DREZGA'S COUNSEL 6 
A. TDC Has Standing to Challenge the District 
Court's Order 6 
B. The District Court Does Not Possess 
Inherent Authority to Appoint Counsel to 
Represent a Defaulting Defendant 7 
1. Judd's "Inherent Authority"Argument 
is Made for the First Time on Appeal 8 
2. The Trial Court's "Inherent Authority" 
is Limited to Appointing Counsel to 
Represent Indigent Parties, Not 
Defaulting Ones 9 
3. The Court Must Reject Judd's Unilateral 
"Findings of Fact" Concerning the 
Grounds for the District Court's Decision 12 
i 
C. Chatterton v. Walker is a "Red Herring" 13 
D. The Court Must Address Whether TDC Has a 
Contractual Obligation to Pay for Drezga's 
Representation 15 
II. BURKE'S REPRESENTATION OF DREZGA WOULD 
VIOLATE THE UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 18 
A. Juddfs Personal Attacks Against TDCs Counsel 
are Irrelevant to the Issue of the Ethical 
Implications of Appointing Burke 18 
B. Drezga Did Not Consent to Representation in 
the Declaratory Action and Such 
Representation Would Violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct 19 
III. JUDD'S HOSTILE PERSONAL ATTACKS ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE UTAH STANDARDS 
OF PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILITY 22 
A. Juddfs Pattern of Misrepresentation 23 
B. The District Court's Complimentary Attitude 
Toward TDCs Counsel Disproves Juddfs 
Baseless Personal Attacks 24 
CONCLUSION 25 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
C'ANILS 
American States Insur. Co. v. Wallet, 4Xd I' \\ IIM ' 
:
 tah I T ! 
,,>,.,;... nv. Repu . . . V -'•••;rr 1","v' 
O. Neb. 
Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 199^ 
Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 44 I, !v i i 4<>5 
Goebelv. ban LUKC C//J .•xninnii. ,• . . , . '/'''I I' r 
8Q- coo i 'i..K A,K R,-n "V 
Gri#?f/i v. (hiffnh, 1999 U'l 78; 985 P.2d 255 
In Re J.D.M., 810 P.2d 494 (Utah Ct. App, I "V11 
Julian v. State of l>ttili, '«)(> l'.2d ' 1" (I M..I, I'J'W) 
Kec \ II App I '/"/ . 2003: Utah App. 
[ cxk ? ' ' 
Osborne v. Ariop** m J " l V/o/vv, 21)03 I'" I I 
7 0 p 3(i sv 
Peterson v. Evan*, i5b i:. 132 (Utah 192r 
n 1 A 
- I 
Nelson v. &// la fe Cow/2/y, 905 P.2d 872 (Utah • 
1995) . " . ' 4,5 
Prince *i• River Mut Ins (a. • . uo; 
56 P.3d 524 . . 23 
Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 
(Utah 1995) 5 
Ruckenbrodv. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325 (Utah 1943) 10 
Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. 
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995) 4, 5 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 
1166 (Utah 1987) 6, 7 
Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24; 44 P.3d 742 8 
State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943) 10 
State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 5 
Spratley v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 UT 39, 
78 P.3d 603 6 
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590 
(Tex. 1996) 7, 9, 10, 16, 17 
United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. N.Y. 
1975) 10 
Utah County v. Alexanderson, 2003 UT App. 153; 71 
P.3d 621 {cert, granted 78 P.3d 987 (2003)) 5 
Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 
99; 61 P.3d 1009 15 
Washington County v. Day, 447 P.2d 189 (Utah 1968) 11 
RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(A) . 5 
IV 
Utah K„ie y,i n c u . , _j 
I I" «li Ui If nt I'rnfr-^jional Conduct 1.4 aA 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct Ru1< " ' A . . . 
I Jtah Rule of Professional Conduct h„K . . i , ' . . . - . . ^u 
' i n i i / i u l ^ , . . ' ». . « , . . . . , . . , 
VTUTES 
.ih Code Annotated >, .-•< 
, l a i . • . . " " . ' ^ . ^ " M 
.-. Annotated §31A-31-10-. . 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-31-105 . 
Utah Cock Aiiiidiaici; ^ . . . . 
\ itail < ml',' AnnH<ilnl ;• 7X»3a- ^5(2)(n] 
1 ~J 
•* « 
OTHER 
45 C.F.R. § 60.13 . i3 
Utah :»(atidaitli i'l hvirssininlism .ind <' ivihlv 1 3 23 
Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility \ 4 24 
\ 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's decision to appoint counsel to represent the defaulting Dr. G. 
Gregory Drezga ("Drezga") and then to order The Doctors1 Company ("TDC"), Drezgafs 
adversary, to pay for that representation is without precedent in this Court. While courts 
have authority to appoint counsel to represent indigent or criminal defendants, no court has 
used that authority to appoint counsel to represent a defaulting defendant for the purpose of 
protecting the interests of the defendant's creditor. Also without precedent is the 
enforcement of such an order on an attorney, such as Petitioner Paul C. Burke ("Burke"), who 
has never had a relationship with Drezga, has no knowledge of whether Drezga wants 
representation, and has absolutely no knowledge of how Drezga wishes to be represented. 
Such an attorney faces peril under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct ("Conduct 
Rules"). The district court abused its discretion in ordering Burke to represent Drezga. 
While the substantive arguments weigh heavily in favor of granting Burke's Petition 
for an Extraordinary Writ ("Petition"), Judd has filled her brief with an onslaught of 
unnecessary and vitriolic personal attacks that veer wildly from the record and into the 
dangerous terrain of blatant misrepresentation. In trying to tell a story much different from 
the record, Judd introduces a series of "myths" that must be exposed. The first myth 
concerns the role of Drezga's malpractice counsel, David Slagle ("Slagle"). Judd falsely 
accuses TDC and Slagle of "collusion" against Drezga's interests. However, nothing but 
Judd's empty rhetoric suggests there was any collusion between TDC and Slagle. The second 
myth Judd introduces is that the district court relied on its "inherent authority" to appoint 
1 
counsel. In fact, the district court never discussed its "inherent authority"—the first reference 
to "inherent authority" appears in Juddfs brief to this Court. The third and most damaging 
myth Judd perpetuates is that TDCs counsel has acted unprofessionally, or that TDC has 
intentionally delayed resolution of this action. The district court's repeated compliments on 
the professionalism of TDCs counsel belies Juddfs recasting of the record. These myths must 
not distract from the proper analysis of the Petition. 
TDCfS RESPONSES TO JUDDVS STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Juddfs "Statement of Relevant Facts" is filled with argument and misrepresentations 
about the record and TDCs conduct. These "facts," written to suggest a conspiracy against 
Judd, are almost uniformly irrelevant to Burkefs Petition and serve only to poison the Court's 
perception of actual events. Such comments have no place in a brief filed with this Court. 
Examining just a few of these "facts" demonstrates that Judd's story cannot be trusted. For 
example, in trying to bolster the meritless claim of collusion, Judd refers to Slagle in Fact 
No. 16 as "the defense counsel hired and arranged by TDC to represent Dr. Drezgafor 
purposes of its summary judgment motion." This is utterly false: TDC never hired any 
counsel to appear for Drezga in the declaratory action. Indeed, Slagle never entered an 
appearance in the declaratory action. Affidavit of David Slagle ("Slagle Aff.") \ 4, attached 
as Ex. A1; R. 1799 at 5. He only participated in the summary judgment hearing at the district 
court's urging (R. 1799 at 5:8-9) and he told the court unequivocally, "I am not in this case. 
JTo address Judd's inaccurate statements, TDC has cited material that is the subject of TDCs 
Motion to Supplement the Record. TDC also includes citations to the existing record, where 
appropriate, to compliment references to material outside the Record. 
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I do not represent anyone in this case." R.1799 at 5:12-13, 20:10-13. Slagle never 
"cooperate[d],f with TDC in this action, as Judd suggests. Slagle Aff. f 19. Furthermore, in 
Fact No. 8, Judd claims that Slagle improperly "passed on . . . federally protected 
documents" to TDC showing Drezga?s fraud. Judd fails to tell the Court, however, that TDC 
obtained these documents pursuant to a lawful Subpoena to which Judd never objected. 
R.1799 at 33:19-20; Slagle Aff. ffl[ 13,19. Incredibly, in Fact No. 38, Judd describes Burke 
as "replacement counsel," a term she repeats more than 70 times in her brief. Drezga never 
had representation in this matter and describing Burke as "replacement counsel" is a blatant 
distortion of fact. 
This brief review provides the Court with a small taste of Juddfs abuse of the record. 
Nevertheless, it should be apparent that these "facts" have nothing to do with the district 
court's authority to appoint counsel or Burke's ability to serve. TDC sought a default on the 
claims in the original Complaint (R. 557), not the Amended Complaint, rendering irrelevant 
Juddfs theory that TDC colluded to obtain a default judgment. Furthermore, Judge Lewis 
repeatedly commended TDC and its counsel. See infra Section III(B). There is no basis for 
Juddfs bad faith rhetoric and the Court did not even hint that its Order was so premised. 
Because Judd's "facts" are not germane to the Court's decision, it is unnecessary to 
address them here. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ^  33; 509 
Utah Adv. Rep. 39. Nevertheless, to assist the Court in separating fact from fiction, TDC 
attaches Addendum 1 to this brief, which responds to Judd's misstatements of fact. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Contrary to Judd's assertions, the district court's decision to appoint counsel and the 
terms of that appointment are reviewed for correctness. See Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 
P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) ("standard of review depends upon the issues presented on 
appeal," and where the issue presents a question of law, it is reviewed for correctness, 
"granting no particular deference to the trial court ruling").2 
The Petition, as the Court acknowledged in its July 27,2004 Order, seeks "revocation 
or clarification of the district court's order," is based on undisputed facts3 and presents 
questions of law only concerning the authority of the court to appoint counsel for a defaulting 
defendant in a civil case at the adversary's expense. Whether such an Order should be 
"revoked" is purely a legal question of the court's authority. The second question, whether 
the Order should be "clarified" to avoid conflict with this Court's Conduct Rules, similarly 
is a legal issue that concerns this Court's 'special interest' in the administration of its rules, 
an issue that Judd acknowledges is reviewed for correctness. Judd Br. at 4. 
Ultimately, Judd's reliance on a "gross and flagrant" abuse of discretion standard is 
2The same standard was used in Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. 
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995), and Julian v. State of Utah, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 
1998). 
3Judd's experts both acknowledge that these issues are legal. "The legal ethics issue raised 
. . . requires direct analysis of the relative roles of the Utah Rules and the legal issues that are 
the province of Judge Lewis." Affidavit of Gary G. Sackett ("Sackett Aff.") R. 1300, ^  12. 
"If Judge Lewis has decided, as a matter of law, that Drezga's interests are entitled to 
representation " Id. ^ f 24 (italics in original). "I offer no opinion on whether a Utah court 
has the authority to appoint counsel for a party and to order another party to pay for it." 
Affidavit of Thomas D. Morgan ("Morgan Aff.") R. 1319,16. 
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inconsistent with this Court's decisions. The cases Judd cites containing the "gross and 
flagrant" language primarily are Court of Appeals decisions where the Legislature had 
specifically denied a right of appeal that could be circumvented by granting extraordinary 
relief.4 See Judd Br. at 2-3 (citing Utah County v. Alexanderson, 2003 UT App. 153; 71 P.3d 
621 (cert, granted 78 P.3d 987 (2003); State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918; Renn v. Utah State 
Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995)). The only instance in which this Court has 
used such language was in reviewing actions of the Board of Pardons, from which appeals 
are statutorily prohibited. See Renn, 906 P.2d at 683. Here, the concern that the Petition 
might be used to circumvent a statutory prohibition on appeal is absent. Rather, the district 
court made clear in ruling on Burke's Motion to Certify this Petition that appellate review 
"must occur" in order "to proceed from this point." R. 1710. This Court's decisions in 
Nelson, Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic and Julian all review legal questions in 
extraordinary writs for correctness. 
Here, the trial court made an unprecedented Order not authorized by contract, statute, 
case law or the court's Rules. It was thus an abuse of discretion under any standard because 
4f,The Legislature has exactingly limited the judgments and orders from which the State may 
appeal... Although the State brings its Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) claim as an original action, this 
proceeding has the same characteristics, and seeks the same review and relief, as would a 
statutory appeal Hence, to avoid transforming this action into an impermissible appeal, 
we must deny the State's request for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ of mandamus." Stirba, 972 
P.2d 918,923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). See also Kee v. Lubeck, 2003 UT App. 177; Utah App. 
Lexis 211 (not for official publication) (petition could be used to circumvent statutory 
restrictions on an appeal). But see Alexander son, 2003 UT App. 153, \ 8 (noting that review 
for "gross and flagrant" error not limited to cases where an appeal is statutorily prohibited). 
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the very purpose of extraordinary relief is "to right fthe wrongful use of judicial authority/" 
Judd Br. at 2 (quoting Osborne v. Adoption Ctr. of Choice, 2003 UT 15, f 26; 70 P.3d 58), 
and the trial court's order appointing counsel would place counsel in jeopardy of violating 
several of this Court's Conduct Rules. Ultimately, the Petition presents a pure question of 
law: whether the trial court wrongfully used its judicial authority to appoint counsel for a 
defendant who evaded service of process, placing the appointed counsel in jeopardy of 
violating professional responsibilities, and in ordering TDC to pay for the defense of its 
adversary. Being mindful that this Court has a 'special interest' in the administration of the 
Conduct Rules (Spratley v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 UT 39 \ 8, 78 P.3d 603; 
Judd Br. at 4), and because the issues presented are questions of law, the appropriate standard 
is correctness.5 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS AUTHORITY TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
FOR DREZGA AND COMPEL TDC TO PAY FOR DREZGAfS COUNSEL. 
A. TDC Has Standing to Challenge the District Court's Order. 
Juddfs claim that TDC lacks standing is without merit. As Burke acknowledged, TDC 
is the real party in interest as the party most directly affected by the district court's order 
appointing counsel for Drezga. R. 1768-1770. Moreover, TDC meets the three standing 
requirements in an extraordinary relief proceeding set forth in Society of Professional 
5Both Burke and Judge Lewis agree that where the underlying issue is a question of law, the 
trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness. Judge Lewis Br. at 1; Burke Br. at 2. 
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Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987). First, TDC had standing to 
challenge the district court's order appointing counsel below. R. 621. Second, the challenged 
ruling is adverse to its interests because it impacts TDC's ability to pursue a default and 
constitutes a monetary award against TDC. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. May field, 923 
S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tex. 1996) (f![requiring a party to advance the litigation costs of the 
opposition in addition to its own expenses so skews the litigation process that any subsequent 
remedy by appeal is inadequate."), attached as Ex. E. Third, TDC appeared before the 
district court and presented its claims. R. 1047-1057. Finally, this Court has recognized that 
TDCfs "position is aligned with petitioner's." Order, July 27,2004, Burke v. Lewis, Case No. 
20040500-SC. Given this alignment of interests, TDC satisfies standing requirements.6 
B. The District Court Does Not Possess Inherent Authority to Appoint 
Counsel to Represent a Defaulting Defendant. 
Abandoning her prior legal justifications, Judd now relies almost exclusively on the 
court's "inherent authority1' to appoint counsel to support the district court's order. The slim 
support for Judd's "inherent authority" argument is a cryptic statement in the October 10, 
2002 Memorandum Decision ("Oct. 10 Decision") (R. 1427-1429): 
The Court is confident that fair play and the interest of justice, as well as the legal 
reasons set forth in the Court's prior opinions, dictate that counsel be appointed. 
6Judd has much greater problems with standing than TDC. Like TDC, Judd appears in this 
proceeding only as a real party in interest. Absent express language in an insurance contract 
in which the insurance company consents to be sued directly by an insured's judgment creditor, 
the judgment creditor's exclusive remedy is to sue the insured. Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 
UT App 444, If 17, 83 P.3d 405. The tortfeasor's victim "has no right of action against [the 
insurance company] directly, and no means to impel [the insured] to obtain a settlement from 
[the insurer] in order to satisfy its judgment." Id. f 18. 
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Id. at 1428. From this sentence, Judd extrapolates that the court was employing its "inherent 
authority to appoint counsel." Of course, the basic flaw in Juddfs argument is that Judd 
confuses the propriety of appointing counsel with the authority to appoint counsel. Whether 
such appointment might be beneficial for a litigant says nothing about whether a court has 
the power or authority to do so. Courts face countless circumstances in which "fair play and 
the interest of justice" might be enhanced by the appointment of counsel for a litigant, 
including a litigant who has defaulted. Nevertheless, courts routinely enter default 
judgments. As demonstrated below, the use of the court's "inherent authority" to appoint 
counsel to represent a defaulting defendant is without precedent and the exercise of that 
authority in these circumstances unquestionably is an abuse of discretion. 
1. Judd's "Inherent Authority" Argument is Made for the First Time on Appeal. 
For the first time, Judd argues that the district court has "inherent authority" to appoint 
counsel and she claims that authority alone is a sufficient basis to sustain the district court's 
order. Nowhere in the nearly two-thousand page appellate record is there any reference to 
either the court's "inherent authority" to appoint counsel or to any of the cases Judd now 
cites. Before this Court will consider an issue on appeal, "the trial court must be offered an 
opportunity to rule on [the] issue." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, \ 11; 44 P.3d 742 (citation 
omitted). The district court never considered whether it had "inherent authority" to appoint 
counsel—an unprecedented ruling TDC would have contested. The issue was not briefed 
and the trial court never suggested that "inherent authority " was the basis for its ruling. Judd 
ignores that the district court relied on "the Utah law alluded to by [Judd] in [her] moving 
8 
papers" to support the appointment of counsel. R. 1024. However, the only authority Judd 
cited was Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997) (R. 654), a case Judd now labels 
a "red herring." Judd Br. at 26. 
2. The Trial Court's "Inherent Authority" is Limited to Appointing Counsel to 
Represent Indigent Parties, Not Defaulting Ones. 
The rhetoric Judd carefully selects from Utah cases does not support Judd's new 
"inherent authority" argument. At best, these cases suggest that the court may appoint 
counsel to represent an appearing, indigent defendant, not a defendant who is in default and 
has not expressed any interest in the litigation. In Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. 
Supp. 1221 (D.Neb. 1995), the court examined the historical and contemporary justifications 
for appointment of counsel in a civil case, concluding: 
If the lack of legal representation is the free choice of the unrepresented party or if it 
results from factors unrelated to the indigency of the plaintiff our system is not 
offended. Where, however, one party is unable to obtain legal representation because 
of indigency, the resulting disparity of advocacy skills clearly offends the principle 
of "equality before the law" underlying our system. 
Id. at 1228 (emphasis added). This framework renders irrelevant Judd's vague argument 
"that courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power" to render decisions that promote 
justice between parties. Peterson v. Evans, 188 P. 152,153 (Utah 1920); Griffith v. Griffith, 
1999 UT 78 f 13; 985 P.2d 255. Such a general proposition says nothing about whether a 
court can appoint counsel for a defendant who maybe avoiding service of process (R. 941-
942), and order the defendant's adversary to fund both sides of the litigation. Juddfs "inherent 
authority" argument is overstated. The Texas Supreme Court rejected an insured's "inherent 
authority" argument in Travelers Indemnity Co., 923 S.W.2d at 594, Ex. E. The insured in 
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Travelers Indemnity, unlike Drezga, actually appeared and requested the appointment of 
counsel. Id. at 591-592, Ex. E. The Texas Supreme Court granted extraordinary relief, 
finding that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the insurer to pay for both sides 
of the litigation. The court expressly limited appointment of counsel in civil cases to repre-
sentation of indigent litigants and only in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 594,7 Ex. E. 
Travelers Indemnity, like Bothwell, makes clear that it is only where a party is 
indigent that a court can deploy its inherent authority to appoint counsel. Both Travelers 
Indemnity and Bothwell presume that the party for whom counsel is appointed actually is 
present, seeks representation and is participating in the litigation. This Court should not 
reward Drezga's non-appearance through the appointment of counsel at his adversary's 
expense. Cf. United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 628 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1975) (holding in 
a criminal case that M[t]he administration of justice is not served by the court's unilateral 
effort to activate the defense of a criminal case in which prosecution has been frustrated by 
the defendant's flight from the jurisdiction."). 
As in other jurisdictions, this Court has strictly anchored the court's power to appoint 
counsel to either indigent or criminal defendants. See Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325 
(Utah 1943) (tracing the historical roots of the inherent authority to appoint counsel and 
holding that an attorney "can be compelled by the court to render gratuitous services in 
defense of indigent[s]."); State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943) (holding that the court 
7In Travelers Indemnity, the court only addressed whether Ihe trial court had the power to 
require the insurer to pay the claimant's fees. The court did not have to address whether the 
trial court had the power to appoint counsel, which was conferred by statute. Id. 
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"has inherent power to direct an attorney to appear and defend one accused of crime."). In 
this light, Judd's reliance on the Court of Appeals' decision in In Re J.DM., 810 P.2d 494, 
498 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and its reference to "the inherent authority of courts to appoint 
counsel when the need arises," is misplaced. 
J.DM. involved representation of an indigent parent in a parental rights termination 
action. The Court of Appeals interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-35(2), which provided a 
right to counsel, and Rule 33 of the Utah State Juvenile Court Rules, which required courts 
to "appoint counsel for the parties if it finds that they are indigent." Id. at 496. The J.DM. 
Court ruled that § 78-3a-35(2)(a) gave the court "dispositive authority to determine when to 
appoint counsel," and upheld the appointment to represent the indigent parent. Id. at 498. 
In dicta, the court noted that this interpretation of the statute was consistent with the court's 
authority to appoint counsel "when the need arises." Id. {citing Washington County v. Day, 
447 P.2d 189, 191 (Utah 1968)). Consistent with this Court's prior rulings on "inherent 
authority," it is plain that "need" described in J.DM. is a literal one: indigency. Other than 
cases applying statutory or constitutional appointment powers, TDC has discovered no Utah 
case upholding the appointment of counsel in any circumstance other than indigency or to 
enforce a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel. 
The Washington County, case cited in J.DM., reveals that the "inherent authority" to 
appoint counsel is tied strictly to indigency. 447 P.2d at 191. Washington County involved 
a criminal prosecution and interpretation of a statute providing representation for indigent 
or criminal defendants. Id. In dicta, the Court stated, "it is true that the courts through their 
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inherent power to prevent a miscarriage of justice have always zealously watched over the 
rights of impecunious defendants and required counsel to give of their time and money to see 
that a proper representation was made." Id. Thus, none of Judd's cited cases support the 
expansive appointment powers Judd claims. These cases clarify that the court's "inherent 
authority" to appoint counsel is limited to representation of indigent or criminal defendants. 
3. The Court Must Reject Judd's Unilateral "Findings of Fact" Concerning the 
Grounds for the District Court's Decision. 
Although Judd admits that the district court did not make any findings of fact to 
buttress the "fair play" rationale for appointing counsel (Judd Br. at 25), Judd nevertheless 
offers her own "findings of fact" to argue that counsel should be appointed because of TDCs 
wrongful conduct. Juddfs radical reinterpretation of the district court's ruling merely relies 
on the discredited myths described at the outset of this Argument and assailed in TDCs 
Responses to Judd's Statement of Facts and in Addendum 1. 
In saying what the district court did not, Judd boldly argues that TDC and Slagle 
colluded to provide TDC access to protected information, appeared "side by side" at the 
summary judgment hearing, and then Slagle "conveniently stepped aside" to enable TDC to 
pursue a default judgment. JuddBr. at 25. These statements are false. First, Slagle provided 
documents in response to a lawful Subpoena, showing Drezga committed fraud in procuring 
insurance.8 R. 1799 at 33:19-20; see also Slagle Aff. % 13. Second, Slagle did not "appear 
furthermore, Utah law specifically allows the disclosure of such information to an insurer. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-31-104 (stating that "upon written request by an insurer to an 
authorized agency, the authorized agency may release to the insurer information or evidence 
that is relevant to any suspected insurance fraud. ");seealso § 31A-31-105;45 C.F.R. § 60.13 
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side by side" with TDC at the summary judgment hearing. Slagle never represented either 
Drezga or TDC in the declaratory action. R. 1799 at 5; Slagle f 4. The district court, not 
TDC, invited Slagle to "come forward" and "pipe into the arguments" at the summary 
judgment hearing. R. 1799 at 5:8-15; id. at f 6. Slagle immediately cautioned, "We really 
are not involved in this case. We are involved in the underlying action." Id. 
Finally, Slagle did not "step aside" to enable a default judgment. R. 1799 at 5; Slagle 
Aff. f 17. Slagle had nothing to "step aside" from—he never represented Drezga in the 
declaratory action. Although, at the district court's urging, Slagle said he would accept 
service of an Amended Complaint, he advised the Court that Drezga had not given him 
permission to do so (R.1799 at 29:12-14; Slagle Aff. If 9), and later wrote that he did not 
believe anything in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permitted him to accept service in a 
matter in which Drezga had not retained him. R. 539. Significantly, TDC never attempted 
to influence Slaglefs conduct in any way and any suggestion of collusion is entirely false. 
Slagle Aff. Tf 19. Judd's efforts to pile myth upon myth to create the appearance of foul play 
is unfaithful to the record, the integrity of the district court's decision, and Judd's 
responsibility to be candid with this Court. 
C. Chatterton v. Walker is a "Red Herring/1 
Before her brief to this Court, Judd relied exclusively on Chatterton v. Walker, 938 
P.2d 255 (Utah 1997), to justify the appointment of counsel. Judd stated unequivocally 
that "Chatterton v. Walker is the applicable case law and is not distinguishable/1 R. 654. 
(granting immunity for furnishing information regarding suspected insurance fraud). 
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Chatterton was the exclusive legal basis for the court's order. Id. After promoting 
Chatterton as the exclusive basis for the court's authority, Judd now dismisses Chatterton as 
a "red herring," "only indirectly referenced by the district court." Judd Br. at 26. The true 
"red herring" is Judd's exaggerated effort to transform the reference to "fair play and the 
interest of justice" into a justification for the unprecedented appointment of counsel to 
represent a defaulting party and compel his adversary to pay for the same. Ultimately, Judd 
fails in her effort to distract this Court from the record she created, a record that relies 
exclusively on Chatterton. R. 654. The explanation for Judd's effort to distance herself from 
Chatterton is a recognition that it is not controlling. TDC's opening brief demonstrated that 
Chatterton's is limited to the insurer's obligation to provide counsel to an insured solely in 
a negligence case where the insurer intervenes and claims the uninsured party was not liable. 
The provision of counsel or reimbursement of expenses should be directly 
related to litigation of the issue of the uninsured motorist's negligence and the 
damages resulting from that negligence and should not implicate collateral 
issues relating to the insurer's intervention. 
Chatterton, 938 P.2d at 262. Nothing in Chatterton suggests that the insurer has an 
obligation to pay for counsel for the insured in a declaratory action, where the insurer 
challenges the existence of coverage. Furthermore, nothing in Chatterton or in any case cited 
to the district court empowers the court to appoint counsel for a defaulting party who has not 
sought representation and to require the adversary to pay for that representation. 
The unfortunate circumstances underlying this action give rise to emotional arguments 
to aid Judd, but the simple truth is that there is no justification for expansion of the court's 
"inherent authority." Thus, under any standard, the district court's decision was more than 
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a garden variety mistake of law, it was a gross and flagrant abuse of judicial authority.9 
D, The Court Must Address Whether TDC Has a Contractual Obligation to 
Pay for Drezga's Representation. 
In TDCs opening brief, TDC explained its obligation to defend Drezga extended only 
to professional malpractice claims. TDC Br. at 32-33. Absent a separate contractual 
obligation, the district court lacked authority to compel TDC to provide Drezga a lawyer in 
any other case. Id. The Order that TDC pay for Drezga's defense amounted to an improper 
award of attorney fees. Id. at 34-35. Plainly, there is an actual controversy whether TDC 
may be compelled to fund its adversary's defense, even though no contract or statute10 
requires it. TDC does not seek an "advisory opinion/1 it seeks relief from an improper Order. 
Judd writes off these arguments as being raised for the first time on appeal, claiming 
that the court never considered the "contractual provisions and proposed interpretations" that 
TDC raises. Judd Br. at 31. This is patently false. The Oct. 10 Decision expressly states that 
"the appointment of counsel is premised on the sound legal reasons set forth in the Court's 
May 22, 2001 decision, and also on defendant Drezga's insurance contract." R. 1428 
(emphasis added). Additionally, in the September 26, 2002 hearing, TDC also expressly 
9Judd's attempt to impose a "marshaling requirement" on TDC is specious. The issue is 
whether the court has authority to appoint counsel, an issue not based on any factual findings. 
The issue is not whether Drezga has adequate representation in the declaratory action. It is 
settled that "[challenges to a trial court's legal determinations... do not require an appellant 
to marshal the evidence." Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, f 14; 
61 P.3d 1009. 
10See, for example, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3, which gives the court discretion in a divorce 
proceeding to order one spouse to pay the attorney fees of the other to enable them to 
"prosecute or defend the action." 
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raised the issue of the court's authority to require TDC to pay for Drezga's representation, and 
the court acknowledged that argument: 
Rencher: First, Your Honor, the issue of who pays [for Drezga's counsel] is improperly 
before the Court. I was advising the Court that that remains to be the problem. 
The issue of who pays is a contractual or legal relationship between an 
attorney and the insurance company. There will be no contractual 
relationship, I think, that can be found. I think there will be no legal 
relationship that Utah law recognizes in this instance with adverse parties 
that can be found. 
* * * 
Judge Lewis: So noted. 
Ex. B; 25:18-25; 26:1-9. These references to TDCs contractual obligations completely 
undermine Judd's argument and credibility. 
The issue in Burke's Petition requires the Court to address whether TDC must pay 
Drezga's fees: "Whether the district court may appoint counsel to represent an absent 
defendant in an action where the defendant's insurer seeks to retroactively invalidate 
an insurance policy issued to the defendant/' Burke Br. at 1 (emphasis added). Even if 
the Court holds there is "inherent authority" to appoint counsel, that determination does not 
resolve the question of whether TDC may be ordered to pay for Drezga's attorney. In 
Travelers Indemnity, the Texas Supreme Court held that without any contractual basis, it is 
an abuse of discretion warranting extraordinary relief for a court to shift the burden of paying 
an indigent claimant's fees to an insurance company because it "radically skews the 
procedural dynamics of the case." 923 S.W.2d at 595. 
Whatever the extent of the trial court's inherent authority [to appoint counsel], 
however, it does not extend to requiring [the insurer] to pay [the attorney's] fees. 
There is no indication in the record before us that the trial court could only have 
carried out its constitutional function by imposing this fee burden on [the insurer]. 
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In the absence of such a showing, allowing trial courts to exercise this power 
under the guise of "inherent authority" would constitute a judicial end-run around 
the statutory fee-shifting scheme. We therefore reject [the claimant's] argument 
that the trial court had inherent authority for its actions. 
Id. at 594.n As in Travelers Indemnity, nothing in the record supports shifting the burden 
of Drezga's defense to TDC. Juddfs personal, but baseless, attacks certainly do not justify the 
Order, as is demonstrated in Addendum 1. Furthermore, Judd's hostile comments stand in 
stark contrast to the district court's consistent praise of TDC and its counsel. See infra at 
Section III(B). TDC demonstrated in its opening brief that there have been no findings, such 
as bad faith or stubborn litigiousness, to justify imposing that burden on TDC. See, e.g., 
American States Insur. Co. v. Walker, 486 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1971). 
This Court must address the grounds for an Order that TDC pay an outside attorney 
to defend Drezga and limit the potentially enormous burden that would necessarily fall on 
the shoulders of future litigants. If this Court takes the momentous steps of allowing the 
appointment of counsel for a defaulting defendant and requiring the adversary to fund both 
sides, then the Court must settle the justifications for such an Order. Plainly, in no case 
where the court used its "inherent authority" to appoint counsel, did the district court 
successfully pass the costs of litigation on to the litigant's adversary.12 
1 !It is not necessary to appoint additional counsel. Without conceding that Judd has standing 
in this case, Judd has access to the same information and arguments as would counsel for 
the absent Drezga. 
12TDC's opening brief explained why Drezga may prefer not to appear and risk a verdict of 
fraud, as opposed to a default judgment, which he may seek to reopen. TDC correctly 
challenged the assumption that Drezga necessarily wanted representation absent any 
evidence, other than his non-participation. Responding to this argument, Judd resorts to 
discredited "myths" about collusion between TDC and Slagle. The lack of any record 
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II. BURKEf S REPRESENTATION OF DREZGA WOULD VIOLATE THE UTAH 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 
A. Judd's Personal Attacks Against TDC's Counsel are Irrelevant to the 
Issue of the Ethical Implications of Appointing Burke. 
Instead of getting to the heart of the second issue, whether Burke's acceptance of the 
appointment would place him in ethical peril, Judd has chosen first to spend two pages 
unloading another series of inappropriate and baseless attacks against TDC and Slagle. Judd 
Br. at 37-38. Amidst this barrage of attacks, Judd accuses TDC of an "ethical extreme 
makeover." Judd Br. at 38. The "extreme makeover" here is Juddfs treatment of the record. 
Judd?s personal attacks are utterly false, as evidenced by the absence of any record 
citation to support them. Judd Br. at 37-38. Judd claims TDC "had counsel appear and 
represent Dr. Drezga" in the declaratory action, when, in fact, Slagle never represented 
Drezga in the declaratory action. R. 1799 at 5:12-13, 6:5-6; Slagle Aff. f 4. Judd questions 
TDCs ethics "at having Drezga!s counsel obtain, and then turn over to TDC, federally 
protected documents." Judd Br. at 37. As Judd knows, these documents were produced in 
response to a lawful Subpoena that Judd never challenged. R. 1799 at 33:19-20; Slagle Aff. 
f 13. Judd accuses TDC of arranging for Slagle to appear "side by side" with TDC at the 
summary judgment hearing (Judd Br. at 37), when the record is clear that Slagle did not 
represent Drezga at that hearing and that it was only at the district court's invitation that 
references on page 35 of Juddfs brief demonstrates how far afield Judd has gone in her 
mischaracterization of the facts. Moreover, Judd misleadingly cites Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-202 (2004) for the proposition that TDC may not retroactively invalidate Drezgafs 
coverage. This statute, as Judd previously conceded at R. 1548, is inapplicable. It applies 
only to an agreement between the insurer and the insured to abrogate the insurance contract. 
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Slagle participated at all. R. 1799 at 5:8-9; Slagle Aff. f 6. Judd accuses Slagle of 
"conveniently step[ping] aside" after TDCs Summary Judgment Motion was denied, when, 
in fact, it was only at the district court's urging that counsel initially agreed to accept service 
on behalf of Drezga, a representation Slagle thoughtfully retracted because Drezga had not 
authorized him to accept service. R.539-540; 1799 at 29:12-15; Slagle Aff. fflf 9-10. 
Critically, TDC and Slagle never discussed at any time any cooperation in the declaratory 
action and any suggestion of collusion between TDC and Slagle is false. Slagle Aff. f 19. 
This fabricated version of the record is inexplicable; Juddfs counsel was at the hearing and 
the transcript speaks for itself. 
Furthermore, the question of whether Drezga was properly served with the Amended 
Complaint or whether acceptance of service was authorized is irrelevant. TDC did not seek 
a default on the Amended Complaint. The status of this case is that there has been no 
response to the original Complaint. The question of service of the Amended Complaint is 
irrelevant. It defies logic why these senseless personal attacks have been made instead of 
substantive argument. It is the ethical implication of Burke's acceptance of the district court's 
appointment that is before the Court. Judd's attacks on the integrity of TDC, its counsel and 
Slagle serve no legitimate purpose. 
B. Drezga Did Not Consent to Representation in the Declaratory Action and 
Such Representation Would Violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Although Juddfs personal attacks are meritless, the quality of the argument contained 
in the reports of the ethics experts is very high. The experts, Skolnick, Charles A. Gruber 
("Gruber"), Gary G. Sackett ("Sackett") and Professor Thomas D. Morgan ("Morgan"), are 
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all qualified to opine on the ethical implications of the court's appointment. It is nevertheless 
apparent that Judd has done a poor job of advocating for her experts. Judd fails to address 
the particular Conduct Rules raised in either Burke's Petition or the Gruber and Skolnick 
Affidavits. Instead, Judd refers to the general need for "flexibility" in interpreting mandatory 
Conduct Rules, the need for "reasonableness," and the "need of courts to assure the proper 
administration of justice." Judd Br. at 39-42. Judd's silence about specific rule violations 
is deafening. Judd appeals to "flexibility," but the mandatory nature of several of the 
Conduct Rules do not give lawyers discretion in their conduct. R. 1238.13 
Judd does not directly refute any of the Conduct Rule violations highlighted in 
Skolnick's report. Under Rule 1.2, it is the attorney's obligation to abide by the client's 
decisions, an obligation that is impossible to meet when the client is absent and has not 
consented to representation. Skolnick also points out that under Rule 1.4, a lawyer must keep 
a client informed of the status of the representation, an obligation that cannot be met. 
Furthermore, Skolnick refers to Rule 1.14, which compels the attorney, insofar as possible, 
to make "adequately considered decisions, although the client's participation may be 
impaired." Skolnick makes clear that although Rule 1.14(a) accounts for impairment "for 
some other reason," not listed in the rule, nothing in Rule 1.14(a) or the accompanying 
comments demonstrates that the rule was intended to apply to non-consensual 
relationships with missing clients. Skolnick also addresses the potential liability exposure 
13Both Prof. Morgan and Sackett explicitly assume that the district court had authority to 
appoint counsel for the defaulting Drezga and order TDC to pay for it. R.1299; R.1319. 
That assumption is wrong and undermines their entire argument. 
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an attorney representing an absent client may face from third persons who dealt with a lawyer 
in good faith. R. 1144-1145. Judd ignores all of these specific conclusions. 
Importantly, Judd fails to address the conclusions in the Gruber Affidavits. Gruber 
persuasively demonstrates that the appointment order compels violation of several mandatory 
rules. R. 1228-1241. Additionally, Gruber's Reply Affidavit, R. 1377-1389, exposes the 
fundamental flaw in the Sackett and Morgan opinions, which Judd never addresses. 
Specifically, Gruber notes that because there has never been an attorney-client relationship 
between Drezga and counsel, Drezga has never consented to representation or given 
implied authority to anyone to retain counsel on his behalf. Gruber concludes that without 
this fundamental agreement, no attorney can represent Drezga in this action. R. 1381.14 
Gruber carefully demonstrates the difference between Drezga's implied consent to accept 
representation in the malpractice action based on the insurance agreement with TDC, and this 
case where there is no consent. R.1231-1232;1382. Gruber also specifically addresses the 
ethics opinions Sackett claims justify the appointment of counsel. Gruber explained that 
where Drezga is completely absent and has expressed no interest in representation, the cases 
addressing representation of present clients, such as indigents, have no application. R. 13 84. 
14Judd erroneously describes Skolnickfs and Gruberfs criticism of the district court's Order 
as relying "on the diminished ability of replacement counsel to consult and communicate with 
Drezga." Judd Br. at 40. Judd misses the point, as demonstrated by her repeated references 
to "replacement counsel." Gruberfs Reply Affidavit makes clear that it is the complete 
absence of any relationship between Drezga and counsel that subjects the appointed attorney 
to ethical peril. It is not merely a failure to communicate with Drezga, but more 
fundamentally, a failure to obtain Drezga's consent to be represented—regardless of whether 
counsel might or might not be able to communicate with Drezga during the litigation. 
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Gruber also distinguishes the opinions of Sackett and Morgan for their failure to cite any 
instance in which a party who has absented himself from the jurisdiction is entitled to 
counsel. R. 1385. In this connection, Gruber reminded the court that Drezga has no right 
to counsel in this civil matter under state or federal Constitutions. 
Ultimately, Juddfs experts take solace in the assumption that it is unlikely that the 
Office of Professional Conduct would proceed against an attorney accepting the appointment. 
This is, of course, pure speculation and a subject over which neither the parties, the experts, 
nor the district court has authority. R. 1384-1385. Thus, Juddfs plea for "flexibility" rings 
hollow when nothing in the Rules or the ethics opinions permit a lawyer to accept an 
appointment to represent a defendant who has disappeared from the jurisdiction, expressed 
no interest in the litigation, and never consented to representation. As Gruber thoughtfully 
concludes, "why should Drezga be rewarded for his refusal to appear in court to defend the 
declaratory action? There appear to be no shortage of people urging this court to appoint 
counsel for Dr. Drezga, except Dr. Drezga himself."15 
III. JUDD'S HOSTILE PERSONAL ATTACKS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILITY. 
Juddfs brief adopts a tone of hostile indignance toward TDC that is entirely 
15The ethical peril to an appointed lawyer is compounded by the practical difficulties of 
representing a missing client. For example, how could counsel, in accordance with Rule 11, 
affirm or deny the allegations in a complaint without consultation? What is the scope of the 
representation? If appointed counsel fails to bring defenses or counterclaims, is that failure 
res judicata as to Drezga? Does appointed counsel face a malpractice action for failure to 
represent him adequately? The hypothetical nature of the problem is irrelevant: what Drezga 
might actually want from counsel has always been the "elephant in the room." 
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unjustified. Juddfs personal attacks against TDC and its counsel rely principally on 
misrepresentations of the record. TDC must address these misrepresentations and set the 
record straight. It would be unfair to allow those accusations from such well-respected 
counsel to go unnoticed or undiscussed. This Court has made clear that misrepresentations 
about opposing counsel and the record do not promote the spirit of professionalism necessary 
to enhance the reputation of the bar: "Neither written submissions nor oral presentation 
should disparage the integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics or personal behavior of an 
adversary, unless such matters are directly relevant under controlling substantive law." 
Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility at If 3 (emphasis added). Plainly, Judd?s 
personal beliefs about TDC or its motives are not relevant to the disposition of this case. Id. 
at Tf 4. Juddfs derogatory remarks "have no place in an appellate brief and [are] of no 
assistance to this court." Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ^  62; 56 P.3d 524. 
A. Judd's Pattern of Misrepresentation. 
Juddfs damaging distortions stand out as even a cursory reference to the record 
reveals. Judd's misrepresentations reach their zenith when she describes Slagle as "the 
defense attorney that TDC originally hired and arranged to appear in court and accept service 
on Drezga's behalf," Judd Br. at 5, an allegation she repeats at pages 11 and 37. The 
suggestion that TDC brought Slagle to the summary judgment hearing to represent Drezga 
in the declaratory action is shockingly false. Slagle made clear to the court that he did not 
represent anyone in the declaratory action. R. 1799 at 5:14-15; 20:10-13; Slagle Aff. \ 6. 
Of course, it was only at the district court's suggestion that Slagle agreed to sit at counsel 
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table and receive service of TDCs Amended Complaint. R.1799 at 5:6-8. 
Judd further distorts the record by referring to "replacement counsel" more than 70 
times throughout her brief, when in fact, Drezga was never represented in this matter. R. 
1799 at 5; Slagle Aff. fflf 4 -5, 17. At no time was there ever any improper communication 
between TDC and Slagle. Id. at^ f 19. Juddfs erroneous description of Slaglefs role goes well 
beyond the realm of "spin." Ultimately, Juddfs effort to turn insinuation and implication into 
fact renders an enormous disservice to this Court. 
B. The District Court's Complimentary Attitude Toward TDCfs Counsel 
Disproves Judd's Baseless Personal Attacks. 
Although this litigation has been ongoing for several years, Judd can find absolutely 
no support in the record for her personal attacks. See Addendum 1. To the contrary, the 
district court has been uniformly complimentary. The district court, who has always been 
in the best position to objectively assess TDCs representation, has consistently applauded 
TDCs efforts. For example, on September 26,2002, the district court stated "Mr. Rencher, 
your representation in this court is professional and, further, I would never question that. I 
know you too well." Hearing of September 26, 2002 at 30:22-25, Ex. B. Furthermore, the 
Court noted, "your integrity [Mr. Rencher] is not at issue." Id. at 31:7-9.16 At the November 
28, 2001 hearing, the district court, addressing Mr. Rencher, stated "I think you are an 
advocate, a zealous advocate, a fine lawyer, and you have always treated me with respect." 
16At the March 24,2003 Hearing on the appointment of counsel, the district court told TDCs 
counsel [Mr. Rencher] that "you have acted with your usual professionalism in this case." 
Hearing of March 24, 2003 at 10:21-23, Ex. C. 
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Hearing of November 28, 2001 at 22:21-25, attached as Ex. D. Later, in that hearing, the 
district court addressed counsel and stated "it's always a pleasure to have you here because 
I know the quality of the written product and the oral argument is always going to be high, 
so even though I may not have ruled in—to everyone's satisfaction—I always am delighted 
to have you all here and appreciate the high quality and professionalism associated with 
anything in which you participate." Id. at 22:6-13; see alsoR.1428 (commending exceptional 
work product). The district court's comments make clear that although the parties are 
engaged in lengthy, difficult litigation, the professionalism of TDC's counsel has never been 
absent. In this light, it is apparent that the insinuations of bad conduct that Judd has injected 
are unfounded. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should revoke the March 8, 2003 Order appointing counsel. 
DATED this $4by of December, 2004. 
EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
Vaun B. Hall 
Attorneys for The Doctors' Company 
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Addendum 1 
ADDENDUM 1 
TDCS RESPONSE TO JUDDyS STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Juddf s brief is overflowing with unsupported arguments and inaccurate representations 
about the facts of this case. While TDC does not respond to every "fact" represented in 
Judd's brief, TDC, in an effort to clarify the record, will address those "facts" that distort the 
issues before the Court. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 2 
TDC objects to Judd's implicit characterization in Fact No. 2 that TDC had an 
obligation to settle Judd's claim prior to TDC exhausting its rights to determine Drezga's 
entitlement to insurance coverage. TDC filed the declaratory action to resolve the scope of 
its obligations under Drezga's policies. R. 6-7. Judd's characterization of TDC's motives and 
intentions is unsupported argument, not fact. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 6 
In Judd's Fact No. 6, she incorrectly characterizes the presence of David Slagle 
("Slagle"), Drezga's counsel in the underlying malpractice case, at the Motion for Summary 
Judgment hearing as an "appearance" by Slagle in this action as counsel for Drezga. In fact, 
Slagle did not enter an appearance on behalf of Drezga in this action. See Affidavit of David 
Slagle (hereinafter "Slagle Aff") f 4, attached as Exhibit A; R. 1799 at 20:10-13. Rather, 
the district court invited Slagle to come forward and sit at counsel table because of his role 
in the underlying malpractice case. R. 1799 at 5:14-15. Indeed, as Slagle noted at that 
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hearing, "[W]e really are not involved in this case. We are involved in the underlying 
action." R. 1799 at 5:14-15; Slagle Aff. 16. 
Additionally, Judd mischaracterizes Slaglefs agreement to accept service on behalf of 
Drezga in the declaratory action as an entry of appearance. In fact, Slagle plainly noted, "I 
am not in this case. I do not represent anyone in this case." R. 1799 at 20:10-11. Slagle's 
expressed concern was that the declaratory judgment action needed to be resolved quickly 
to determine the scope of his possible representation in the underlying malpractice action. 
R. 1799 at 21:15-19. Accordingly, at the district court's urging, Slagle said he was willing 
to accept service of TDCs Amended Complaint in the declaratory judgment action but 
expressly cautioned that "the only problem is, I don't have permission from my client to 
accept service." R. 1799 at 29:6-14; Slagle Aff. f 9 . The district court stated it would then 
deal with that later if it became a problem. Id. at 15-18. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 8 
Juddfs Fact No. 8 unleashes a profound mischaracterization of the propriety of TDCs 
counsel's conduct that permeates Juddfs entire brief. Through not-so-subtle implication, Judd 
suggests that Slagle colluded with TDC in providing "federally protected documents" 
showing that Drezga committed fraud on his insurance application. In fact, the record is 
clear that TDC obtained these documents through a lawful Subpoena served on Slagle, 
a copy of which was also served on Juddfs counsel. R. 1799 at 33:19-20; see also Slagle 
Aff. HTf 13, 19. 
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Furthermore, Juddmisleadingly characterizes TDCs statement that it was "not entitled 
to get" those documents on its own. R. 1799 at 32:19. TDC only raised the issue of its 
entitlement to the documents during colloquy concerning why TDC had not raised the issue 
of Drezga's fraudulent misrepresentations earlier in the litigation, or when TDC first issued 
the insurance policy. Id. at 31:15-25, 32:1-22. There was nothing improper or unethical 
about TDC obtaining these highly relevant documents from Slagle pursuant to a lawful 
Subpoena and any implication of impropriety is misleading and false. Slagle Aff. f 14. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 9 
TDC again objects to Judd's characterization in Fact No. 9 concerning the means 
through which TDC received documents showing that Drezga lied on his malpractice 
insurance application. These documents were not disclosed in a suspect manner, as Judd 
implicitly suggests. R. 1799 at 33:19-20; see also Ex. A, Slagle Aff, and Subpoena for 
Production of Documents attached to Slagle Aff. as Ex. 1. Indeed, only after TDC obtained 
an order from the district court governing their disclosure did TDC make them available for 
the district court's in camera review, and the district court expressly noted that TDC "was 
correct in not providing [the documents] until he had a court order suggesting that they had 
to be provided." R. 1799 at 18:18-22. 
Furthermore, there was also no impropriety in Slagle's Affidavit. This Affidavit was 
provided under a caption for the underlying malpractice case. R. 48-49; Slagle Aff. If 15. 
Moreover, the content of this Affidavit is undisputed and undisputable. It merely recites 
Slagle's inability to communicate with Drezga—a fact that Judd never contested or could 
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contest. R. 48-49. TDC never suggested or attempted to discuss with Slagle that he 
cooperate with TDC in the declaratory action. Slagle Aff. f^ 19. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 11 
In Fact No. 11, Judd misleadingly characterizes Slagle's statement that "Dr. Drezga, 
my client, most likely lied on his application for insurance," as an effort to "expedite" a ruling 
against Drezga. R. 1799 at 221:13-14; Judd Br. at 11. The statement is taken completely out 
of context. Slagle was merely addressing the facts and documents the Court had previously 
received in the course of the hearing. R. 1799 at 21:8-19; Slagle Aff. f 16. Slagle made 
clear to the Court that to determine whether he should continue his defense of Drezga in the 
underlying malpractice action, he would first need a decision from the district court on the 
declaratory judgment action. Id. Slagle made these comments before the district court ever 
asked him to receive service in the declaratory action. Additionally, Judd ignores that Slagle 
also expressly stated that he would not advocate for TDC's position in the declaratory 
action: 
Mr. Slagle: The fact is, as you look at these documents, that he had three settled 
malpractice cases that he did not disclose on his application for 
insurance. Whether that's legally sufficient or not to cancel a policy 
retroactively, that's up for The Doctors' [Company] to argue. I 
certainly wouldn't argue that. But nothing is going to change just 
because an amended complaint is filed. 
The Court: I see what you're saying. 
M a t 22:5-12. 
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RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 12 
Once again, in Fact No. 12, Judd negatively mischaracterizes Slagle's so-called 
"disclosure" of "federally protected information" to TDC. As established, the documents 
showing Drezga committed fraud were produced in response to a lawfully issued Subpoena 
and were before the district court for the Court's own inspection. R. 2799 at 33:19-20; Slagle 
Aff.f 13. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 15 
Judd also misleadingly characterizes the district court's decision denying TDCs 
Motion for Summary Judgment in Fact No. 15. The district court never "factually found" 
that TDC failed to demonstrate Drezga's lack of cooperation in his malpractice defense. 
Rather, the Court decided the issue "as a matter of law." R. 513. Judd also mischaracterizes 
the Court's rationale for not retroactively rescinding Drezga's malpractice insurance policy. 
The district court never made any finding of the fact that TDCs efforts to rescind were 
"motivated by and rose only after learning of the malpractice involving an innocent injured 
third party." The Court never imputed any wrongful motive to TDC in its summary judgment 
decision (R. 509-516), or at any time in this litigation. In fact, the Court commended all 
counsel for their handling of the case. R. 1427-1428. See Section III(B) of TDCs Reply 
Brief. 
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RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 16 
Juddfs mischaracterization of the record is most blatant in Fact No. 16, where Judd 
misleadingly describes Slagle as ffthe defense counsel hired and arranged by TDC to 
represent Dr. Drezga for purposes of its summary judgment motion." As already 
established, Slagle did not represent Drezga for purposes of the summary judgment motion, 
explicitly advised the Court of that fact, and never entered an appearance on behalf of Drezga 
in the declaratory judgment action. R. 1799 at 5:14-15, 20:10-13; Slagle Aff. ffi[ 4, 5, 6. 
Indeed, Judd herself advised the district court that Slagle was only retained "to represent Dr. 
Drezga in the underlying [malpractice] action." R. 609. More generally, of course, Judd is 
simply wrong in asserting that TDC ever hired counsel to represent Drezga in the declaratory 
judgment action. 
Additionally, Judd is incorrect that Slagle's refusal to appear on behalf Drezga in the 
declaratory judgment action left Drezga "without effective legal representation." Drezga 
never had legal representation in this declaratory action. Drezga left himself without 
effective legal representation through his avoidance of service of process and failure to 
respond to the properly published Summons authorized by the district court and the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 17 
Judd again distorts the role of Slagle in this action in Fact No. 17. The refusal of 
Slagle to represent Drezga in this action did not leave Drezga "unrepresented" for the simple 
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reason that he was never represented in this action. R. 1799 at 5:12-13, 6:1-6; Slagle Aff. 
If 4. According to the Order Judd herself prepared in the underlying malpractice 
action, and signed by the Court in that action, "there is reason to believe that the 
Defendant [Drezga] is avoiding service of process." R. 941-942 (emphasis added). Thus, 
Drezgafs apparent flight to avoid service, as Judd represented to the Court in the underlying 
malpractice action, explains why he is unrepresented in this declaratory action. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 18 
Juddfs assertion in Fact No. 18, that Slagle "conveniently stepped aside" to enable 
TDC to pursue its default judgment motion, is patently incorrect. The only record citation 
Judd offers for this assertion comes from Juddfs own brief before the district court, which 
does not support the inference of collusion Judd attempts to create. Slagle never acted for 
TDCs benefit (R. 1799 at 22:4-12; Slagle Aff. | 19), never represented Drezga in the 
declaratory action, and there was never any improper collusion between TDC and Slagle. 
R. 1799 at 5:14-15, 20:10-13, 29:12-14; Slagle Aff. 1fi[ 4, 11, 19. Indeed, Slagle never 
discussed with TDC the content of the letter refusing to accept service, or his intention to 
write such a letter, except to the extent that he advised all parties in open court that he was 
not authorized to accept service. R. 1799 at 29:12-14; Slagle Aff. 112. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 20 
Judd improperly puts words in the mouth of the district court when she states in Fact 
No. 20, that the "district court factually found" that Drezga did not have adequate 
representation in this matter, and that Drezga was in an adversarial position with TDC. In 
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fact, in the district court's May 22,2001 Decision, the Court did not set forth any findings of 
fact, and Judd's characterization of the district court's conclusions as being "factual," is not 
consistent with the Court's opinion. R. 1024-1025. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 21 
Judd falsely states that "TDC openly resisted the district court's order to retain 
replacement counsel for Drezga." To be sure, TDC sought to stay the district court's order 
requiring the appointment of counsel (R. 1119), but seeking this Court's review of a lower 
court's decision does not amount to "openly resisting] the district court's order." Such a 
characterization falsely impugns TDC's conduct in this action, which the district court has 
consistently applauded as maintaining the standards of utmost professionalism. R. 1427-
1428; see Section III(B) of TDC's Reply Brief (citing several examples of the district court's 
praise for the professionalism of TDC's representation). 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 23 
Judd's description of TDC as "defiant" of the district court's order to appoint counsel 
is both inappropriate and unsupported by the record. It was not in defiance, but in 
compliance with the district court's order to appoint counsel that TDC approached attorney 
Michael F. Skolnick ("Skolnick") to represent Drezga in this declaratory action. Skolnick's 
March 12,2002 Affidavit expressly states as much: "I was recently contacted by counsel for 
The Doctor's Company and requested to inform the Court whether I would accept 
representation of Gregory Drezga in this case." R. 1125. Skolnick is a well-respected 
attorney in this community, and the unsupported suggestion that he compromised his integrity 
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to enable TDCs "defiance" of the district court is simply stunning and reflects a real lack of 
candor with this Court. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 25 
TDC objects to Juddfs characterization in Fact No. 25 of TDCs request that the district 
court reconsider the appointment of counsel to defend Drezga as the "latest delay." As 
evidenced by the district court's certification of the question of the propriety of appointing 
counsel to this Court, it strains reason and the record to suggest that seeking clarification of 
a novel question of Utah law constituted a mere delay tactic.1 
1
 Juddfs repeated allegation that TDC has "single-handedly" delayed the litigation is false and 
unfair. For the past 20 months, TDC has awaited resolution of Burkefs ethical concerns 
regarding his appointment as counsel. Prior to that, between February 2002 and March 2003, 
TDC was, in part, trying to comply with the district court's order to appoint counsel, by 
contacting attorney Michael Skolnick, who declined to accept the appointment of counsel 
because of ethical concerns. R. 1138-1147. Rather than chastise TDC for any delay, the 
district court applauded counsel for "the exceptional work product they have produced 
in an effort to fully inform this court of the ethical considerations involved in 
appointing counsel for defendant Drezga." R. 1427 (emphasis added). Between January 
2000 and February 2002, the parties were trying to resolve TDCs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and crucial issues concerning the discovery of database records showing that 
Drezga committed fraud in his insurance application. The Court also required TDC to amend 
its Complaint during this period and there was an almost-eight-month delay arising from the 
briefing of the Motion for Summary Judgment and its ultimate denial in October of 2000. 
Prior to that, the Court had to resolve Judd's Motion to Appoint Counsel and Judd's own 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the attendant briefing required on these pleadings. 
Critically, at no time during the litigation of the declaratory action has the district court ever 
chastised TDC for delaying the case or being dilatory in its conduct. The Court was 
uniformly complimentary of TDCs involvement in this case and never complained, as Judd 
does, that TDC was responsible for delaying the litigation. See Reply Brief Section III(B). 
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RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 28 
Judd misrepresents the content of Mr. Sacketfs report in Fact No. 28. Sackett never 
used the erroneous phrase "replacement counsel" to refer to a lawyer appointed to represent 
Drezga. In trying to advance her agenda, Judd is not being candid with the Court and her 
repeated use of the term "replacement counsel" more than 70 times is improper. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 35 
Judd is wrong in asserting in Fact No. 35 that TDC "flatly refused to comply" with the 
district court's order appointing counsel. Juddfs allegation, taken from the order Judd 
prepared, takes TDCs statements at the hearing on the appointment issue entirely out of 
context. As a courtesy to both the Court and Burke, the attorney appointed to represent 
Drezga, TDCs counsel expressed his belief that the issue of payment of fees would have to 
be resolved separately from the issue of appointing counsel to represent Drezga. Transcript 
of Hearing of March 24,2003 at 5:5-19, attached as Exhibit C.2 TDC noted that under Utah 
law, unless there is a "contractual, a statutory or a case law basis," attorneys fees could not 
be awarded. Id. Indeed, the Court went on to note, "it seems to me that itfs an expense [the 
attorney fees] that ought to be borne equally by both sides." Id. at 6:12-13. Although the 
district court ultimately ruled that TDC should pay Burke's fees, TDC has never formally 
2The transcript of the November 28, 2001 hearing (Exhibit D), the September 26, 2002 
hearing (Exhibit B), and the March 3, 2003 hearing (Exhibit C) were prepared by Rocky 
Dustin, Reporters, Inc., a certified court reporter who attests to their accuracy. Because of 
the unanticipated nature of the Judd brief, TDC did not order the transcripts of the 
proceedings in accordance with Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TDCs 
previously-filed Motion to Supplement the Record. 
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refused to pay appointed counsel as Judd misleadingly states. Rather, TDC has stated a 
consistent position that it objects to any such payment and its statement that "I caution the 
parties, my opponents here, that [the payment of fees] may be come an issue for future 
consideration and those attorneys may be — should be properly advised of that" simply put 
the issue on the radar for the district court and the appointed attorney. Hearing of 
September 26, 2002 at 26:2-8, attached as Exhibit B. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 36 
Once again, Judd wrongly characterizes TDCs effort to obtain a final determination 
of the novel question of appointing counsel in this case as "resisting compliance with the 
district court's orders." Burke felt compelled to petition for an extraordinary writ and this 
Court's willingness to grant TDC the right to brief the questions before the Court evidences 
the viability of TDCs concerns with the legal justifications underlying the district court's 
order to appoint counsel to represent a defaulting defendant. Judd does not acknowledge the 
incredible substantive difference between seeking appellate review and openly defying a 
court order. 
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 38 
In Fact No. 38, Judd again refers to Burke's role as "replacement counsel," a 
misleading and incorrect description of Burke's role in this litigation. This misleading 
characterization appears more than 70 times in Judd's brief. Judd's reference to Burke as 
"replacement counsel," suggests that Drezga had representation at one time, but that counsel 
"stepped aside" to aid TDC. The record is clear that no appearance was ever entered on 
11 
Drezga's behalf in this matter. R. 1799 at 5:12-13; Slagle Aff. 1fl[ 4-5, 17. The original 
Complaint was properly served on Drezga by publication pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. R. 44-45. This method of service was the same Judd used in the underlying 
malpractice action. R. 941-942. This service was based on several affidavits Judd submitted 
to the Court in the malpractice action. R. 27-34. Drezga defaulted. He did not file an 
answer to TDCf s declaratory action. He has never had representation in this matter. Assigning 
the title of "replacement counsel" to the first attorney appointed to that role is a blatant 
distortion of the facts in this case. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAUL C. BURKE, 
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HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS, 
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THE DOCTORS' COMPANY; G. GREGORY 
DREZGA, M.D., and HEIDI JUDD, personally 
and as the natural parent and guardian of ATHAN 
MONTGOMERY, for and on behalf of ATHAN 
MONTGOMERY, 
Real Parties in Interest. 
AFFIDAVIT 
OF 
DAVID SLAGLE 
Case No. 20040500-SC 
990904527 
On Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
to the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
Honorable Leslie Lewis Presiding 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
David Slagle, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a partner at the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. I am 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and have been so licensed since 1968. 
2. I was retained by The Doctors' Company to represent defendant, G. 
Gregory Drezga, M.D. ("Drezga"), whom The Doctors' Company had insured, in the defense 
of a medical malpractice claim made by Heidi Judd personally and as natural parent and 
guardian of Athan Montgomery in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, Utah (the "Malpractice Action"). 
3. While I was representing Drezga in the Malpractice Action, The 
Doctors1 Company separately brought a declaratory judgment action in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County (the "Declaratory Action"), by which it sought a 
judicial declaration that it was not obligated to insure Drezga or provide him a defense in the 
Malpractice Action. 
4. At no time did I represent either Drezga or The Doctors1 Company in 
the Declaratory Action. 
5. Because the Declaratory Action concerned my continued representation 
in the Malpractice Action, I attended the hearing held on the summary judgment motion on 
June 29, 2000. (Record 1799.) I did not enter an appearance on any person's behalf at that 
time. 
6. I have read in the Brief of Real-Party-In Interest, Heidi Judd, that I 
"likewise appeared and agreed in open court to accept service on behalf of Dr. Drezga in the 
declaratory action so that the hearing on TDCs summary judgment motion could proceed 
that day." Judd Brief at 8,^[6. That statement is not accurate. Because I would be affected 
by the motion, I attended the hearing, as did the attorney who represented Tooele Valley 
Regional Medical Center in the Malpractice Action. We initially did not sit at counsel table 
and did so only upon specific invitation from the Court. The transcript of the June 29, 2000 
summary judgment hearing makes this clear and makes clear that I was not representing Dr. 
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Dregza in that hearing. At Page 5 (R. 1799), the Court invited me to "come forward so in 
case you want to pipe into the arguments, you can." I responded "Thank you. We really are 
not involved in this case. We are involved in the underlying action." The Court indicated 
that it understood but invited me to "listen and be party to that." R. 1799 at 5:14-15. 
Thereafter, I made clear to the Court that "I am not in this case. I do not represent anyone in 
this case but I need to point out these things to the Court, though, because I am in a position 
that is very difficult for me." R. 1799 at 20:10-13. 
7. With regard to the service of the Amended Complaint in the 
Declaratory Action, Mr. Rencher sought clarification of the Court's Order granting him the 
right to amend the Complaint. Mr. Rencher pointed out that "this is not really something that 
needs to be published again. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an Amended Complaint 
can be sent by mail to the defendant, after the Complaint has been filed and the defendant 
was served." R. 1799 at 28:5-8. 
8. The Court pointed out the difficulty of serving an Amended Complaint 
because Drezga had disappeared. In response to counsel's request for an expedited 
determination, the Court was interested in "getting the Amended Complaint filed so I can 
move forward and make a ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. We'll deal with the 
issues of whether he needs to be served again and how later." R. 1799 at 28:18-21. 
9. Thereafter, the Court suggested that I could accept service of process. 
After I pointed out that "there has been service effectuated through publication on the 
original Complaint" (R. 1799 at 29:9-10), I said that I would be willing to accept service but 
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"the only problem is, I donft have permission from client to accept service, but I think legally 
that may be sufficient." The Court recognized the difficulty I faced and said "if there is an 
objection at some time raised by his client, then we'll have to go through the formality of 
handling it in the more time-honored manner." R. 1799 at 29:16-18. My office thereafter 
accepted service in accordance with Judge Lewis's suggestion. 
10. After receiving Mr. Rencher's Motion for Clarification of Order 
Denying Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 30, 2000,1 felt compelled to clarify 
the situation and, in a letter dated November 6, 2000,1 advised Mr. Rencher, Mr. McConkie 
and the Court as follows: 
I seem to recall that Judge Lewis suggested that your Amended 
Complaint could be served on me, as attorney for Dr. Drezga. 
As I have thought about it, I see no way that I could accept 
service for Dr. Drezga. He has not authorized me to do so. I 
have never talked to Dr. Drezga. Although I am representing 
him in the case filed by Heidi Judd, which is scheduled to go to 
trial on December 4 in Judge Wilkinson's court, I was retained 
by the insurance carrier to defend him in that case and am doing 
so under a reservation of rights. 
I do not believe there is anything in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that allows me to accept service for Dr. Drezga in a 
matter where I have not been retained by Dr. Drezga. 
R. 539-540. 
11. To the extent that Judd now implies that I colluded with counsel for 
. The Doctors' Company and falsely claimed that I represented Drezga "for purposes of 
[TDC's] summary judgment motion" (Judd Brief p. 11, f 16), that is not true. I repeatedly 
pointed out to the Court at the summary judgment hearing that I did not represent Drezga in 
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that hearing, that I was not authorized to accept service of process on his behalf and that I 
was not making an appearance in that case. R. 1799 at 5:14-15; 20:10-13; 29:12-14. 
12. I did not discuss with Mr. Rencher, or with any representative of The 
Doctors1 Company, the content of my November 6 letter or my intention to write such a 
letter, except to the extent that I advised all parties and the Court in open court that I was not 
authorized to accept service. 
13. Judd also alleges that I disclosed federally-protected information to Mr. 
Rencher, as counsel for TDC. Judd Brief p. 10, ^ f 12. Judd fails to point out that I produced 
the documents in question in response to a Subpoena TDC caused to be served on me. 
Counsel for Judd received a copy of the Subpoena when served. See Exhibit A attached 
hereto. 
14. Judd asserts that the documents I produced in response to a lawful 
Subpoena "were obtained and passed on to Rencher by none other than the TDC-affiliated 
counsel, hired to represent Dr. Drezga." Judd Brief p. 9, % 8. To the extent that this 
statement implies that there was some wrongdoing, I would deny that. 
15. The assertion in Paragraph 9 of the Judd Brief, that I disclosed 
federally-protected information about my client to Mr. Rencher and signed an Affidavit to 
support the summary judgment motion, is similarly misleading and unfair. The Affidavit I 
provided was provided under a caption for the Malpractice Action. It merely recites my 
undisputed inability to communicate with Dr. Drezga — a fact that Judd never contested or 
could. R. 48-49. 
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16 When I addressed the Court regarding Dr Drezga's failure to disclose 
prior malpractice actions against him, I was merely addressing the facts and documents the 
Court had received in the course of the hearing (R 1799 at 21 8-19) and that the insurance 
application did not disclose the three malpractice settlements that were disclosed in the 
records the Court had received Id These facts, drawn from documents the Court had before 
it, had implications for my continued representation m the Malpractice Action The Court 
needed to understand these facts so that I could receive guidance for my continued 
representation, if any 
17 The assertion m Paragraph 18 of the Judd Brief, that I "conveniently 
stepped aside enabling TDCs default motion" and the repeated references to "replacement 
counsel" are misleading As I previously pointed out, I never represented Dr Dregza in the 
Declaratory Action and made that point clearly and repeatedly I did not "step aside" because 
I never entered an appearance on behalf of Dr Drezga I made clear to the Court that I had 
no authority to accept service of process of an Amended Complaint The Judd Brief 
concedes at Paragraph 17, The Doctors' Company never attempted to obtain default judgment 
upon the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, service of which Judge Lewis 
asked me to accept 
18 As I pointed out to Judge Lewis, I believe I was m an extremely 
difficult situation of trying to represent a client with whom I could not communicate I had 
been retained by the insurance company under its authority to retain counsel to defend claims 
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against its insured. I believed it important to all sides, including to Judd, to have the question 
of whether there was a valid insurance policy determined as early as possible. 
19. Throughout my representation of Dr. Drezga, neither Mr. Rencher nor 
any other representative of The Doctors1 Company attempted to influence in any way any 
action I took in representing Dr. Drezga. Nor did Mr. Rencher or any other representative of 
The Doctors' Company attempt to have me take any action in the Declaratory Action, other 
than to fulfill the request Judge Lewis made to me in open court to accept service of the 
Amended Complaint. Mr. Rencher never suggested or attempted to discuss with me the 
possibility of a default judgment or my role in the same, or that I cooperate with the 
Declaratory Action. He never evidenced any desire and did not attempt to obtain federally-
protected information in any fashion not properly provided for by this Court's rules. In short, 
the suggestion of any collusion between me and Mr. Rencher is entirely false. 
Further Affiant saith naught. 
Dated this ^ day of (pj? (C^rx WA 2004. 
spJfoj 
David Slaw 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9^ day of /tPjLLsu*UA^\ 
2004. 
My Commission Expires: 
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NOTARY PUBLIC 
PATRICIA B. BIRCH 
10 Exchange Placa 
NtwhouM tWQ. 1 tth Floor 
Sail U M City, OT M i t l 
Jaryl L. Rencher #4903 
Scott Wood, #5885 
EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Crandall Building Fifth Floor 
10 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 983-9800 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOCTORS- COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. ] 
G. GREGORY DREZGA, MD; and HEIDI J. ; 
JUDD, personally and as the natural parent and; 
guardian of ATHEN MONTGOMERY, for ; 
and on behalf of ATHEN MONTGOMERY, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
) [No appearance required] 
) Civil No. 990904527 
) Judge Leslie Lewis 
TO: David Slagle, Esq., Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, #1100, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84111 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to produce at the offices of Epperson & Rencher, 500 Crandall 
Building, 10 West 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, on or before Friday, the 9* day of June, 2000, 
and all records regarding G. Gregory Drezga, M.D. This would include, but not be limited to, the 
credidation file, records of any settlement payments, apphcations for insurance with the Doctors Company, 
application for privileges at an hospital, and any other document relating to Dr. Drezga's insurance 
coverage, applications therefore, or other lawsuits in which he has been involved, whether resolved or not. 
All documents produced by outside entities should be produced as well. 
DATED this 2-ffi day of May, 2000. 
EPPERSON & RENCHER 
JARYL L. RENCHER 
R. SCOTT WOOD 
Attorney for Defendant 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the Jj(p day of May, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Subpoena 
Duces Tecum was mailed. U.S. Mail first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
James W. McConkie 
Parker, McKeown & McConkie 
Attorneys for Defendant Judd and Montgomery 
Woodlands Business Center 
4001 South 700 East Suite 500 
Salt Lake City. UT 84107 
David W. Slagle 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Lewis B. Quigley 
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1 S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 2002 3 :18 p.m. 
2 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
JUDGE LEWIS: We are here in the case of The 
Doctors Company vs. Drezga, et. al., it's 990904527. 
Mr. Rencher, you're here on behalf of the 
plaintiff; is that correct? 
MR. RENCHER: That's correct, The Doctors 
Company. 
JUDGE LEWIS: And Mr. McConkie and Parker are 
here on behalf of the defendants? 
MR. PARKER: That's correct. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Thank you. And I'm happy to 
hear the arguments. As I understand it, we are here on 
the issue of counsel's appointment; is that correct? 
MR. RENCHER 
JUDGE LEWIS 
MR. RENCHER 
That's correct, Your Honor. 
All right. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
Jaryl Rencher on behalf of The Doctors 
Company. We appreciate Your Honor's consideration. I'm 
aware of the Court's order requesting no more than 15 
minutes per side and so let me be brief, if I may. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Okay. 
MR. RENCHER: The Court has before it a host 
of affidavits on both sides of the issue, an affidavit 
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1 from Mr. Skolnick, whom my client tried to retain, who 
2 believes it would be unethical for counsel to appear for 
3 Dr. Drezga. 
4 The Court also has an affidavit by Charles 
5 Gruber, former — I think the title was assistant 
6 disciplinary counsel for the Utah State Bar, who 
7 likewise believed it would be unethical for any counsel 
8 to appear without Dr. Drezga's express request or 
9 consent. 
10 The Court has before it an affidavit from what 
11 I understand is the current chair of the ethics advisory 
12 panel of the Bar, claiming it would not be unethical. 
13 And then an affidavit by -- and I apologize not knowing 
14 his name, a professor at BYUfs law school, also 
15 concurring in that view. 
16 I also filed a response of affidavit by 
17 Mr. Gruber. Mr. Gruber, when he saw the affidavits that 
18 the Montgomerys had proposed, felt strongly enough that 
19 he was willing to do a responsive affidavit, and that's 
20 before Your Honor. 
21 The issue, I think, could be decided by Your 
22 Honor in weighing those affidavits and concluding where 
23 your judgment properly lies. And Ifm not going to pull 
24 one up and show the other one and try to compare them. 
25 I want to talk just briefly about the 
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1 practicalities of the matter. This results in part from 
2 a conversation with Mr. Gruber, and so I do this with 
3 some degree of serious -- with very serious degree of 
4 concern, because I bounced this off of Mr. Gruber as to 
5 what-ifs. 
6 This is the major concern that I see. If the 
7 Court appoints counsel for Dr. Drezga in this case, 
8 without Dr. Drezga's knowledge or permission, there are 
9 real life hypotheticals that can occur. Some may be a 
10 stretch, some may be not a stretch, but real life 
11 hypotheticals can occur that will point out how the 
12 ethical issues are triggered. 
13 If that counsel were to appear for Dr. Drezga 
14 with a notice of appearance, that counsel then has to a 
15 make a determination as to, number one, whether they 
16 oppose and/or accept service of the amended complaint 
17 that I have requested Your Honor again allowing me to 
18 serve, which alleges fraud in the contract. 
19 Or, two, whether they reject any request by 
20 the Montgomerys or others to accept service of that 
21 complaint and allow a default to be entered on the 
22 nonfraud allegations. 
23 One may say, well, why in the world would 
24 counsel allow a default to be entered when he could 
25 answer the amended complaint and defend on those new 
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1 fraud allegations? The problem is this: There is 
2 substantial evidence before Your Honor in the form of 
3 earlier papers filed with motions that a reasonable jury 
4 could conclude indicates Dr. Drezga committed fraud on 
5 The Doctors Company in the contracting for that 
6 I insurance. 
This relates back to the old question: Were 
you ever involved in any malpractice litigation? And we 
have cited the Court at least three instances where he 
is . 
We would, likewise, then go get affidavits 
from those insurance companies, bring those witnesses to 
trial who will say, "I expect that I sat down with 
Dr. Drezga and, of course, he was aware of this 
litigation. He had to consent to the sum." A jury 
could conclude after the evidence that Dr. Drezga 
committed fraud. 
That attorney for Dr. Drezga has just 
committed an ethical violation. If Dr. Drezga returns 
from parts unknown, be it Tibet, where he is studying 
with the monks or anywhere else, and wants to practice 
law in most -- excuse me, medicine, in most 
jurisdictions in this country, he is going to have to 
meet professional standards. 
Fraud, a finding of fraud, may preclude his 
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ability to ever practice medicine again. And he may say 
to that attorney, "Look, I have no assets, I couldn't be 
found. A default I can always come back and explain to 
an insurance company that wants to insure me for future 
care by saying, Look, I was away. I didn't know. I had 
no excess exposure, but now I can't practice at all 
because youfve got a finding of fraud against me." 
The other problem I see if that counsel 
appears without Dr. Drezga's permission is that we will 
be back to the question that Your Honor has wrestled 
with in a former order, if I may be so — if I may 
clarify it as such. 
I have requested a default on a nonamended 
complaint. Your Honor, I think, has acknowledged that 
that seems on its face to be inconsistent with Your 
Honor's ruling that an insurance company can never 
rescind coverage if there is an innocent third party, 
but that Your Honor would reconsider that at a later 
time after counsel is appointed. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Right. 
MR. RENCHER: The concern I have, Your Honor, 
is that default issue will repeatedly arise when I send 
a request for admissions and interrogatories. The rules 
do not allow that counsel to answer those 
interrogatories and sign off on them. If they are not 
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1 answered, I'm going bring a Rule 37 motion to compel and 
2 then I'm going to request sanctions of default for 
3 I dismissal. 
I'm going to notice up Dr. Drezga's deposition 
if that counsel appears. Dr. Drezga is obviously, I 
don't think, going to appear, and I'm going to be back 
to the Court requesting sanctions. Because he is 
properly before this jurisdiction, he has an obligation 
to appear. 
I have not found a case, Your Honor, where our 
Supreme Court -- it may be out there, but I apologize, I 
haven't found it, where the Supreme Court has forgiven a 
party's failure to appear when properly served under the 
alternate procedures allowed by our Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
We have served him at least twice the way Your 
Honor requested us to, once the same way the Montgomerys 
did. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Yes. 
MR. RENCHER: And he has failed to appear. 
What is the practical outcome of not 
appointing counsel? 
If Your Honor decides that the call is too 
close, that Your Honor's order cannot conceivably 
protect counsel, even if that counsel is willing to take 
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1 the risk of a finding of unethical conduct, and says it 
2 will not appoint -- require the appointment of counsel, 
3 the practicalities of that are that we're back to the 
4 question, will Your Honor enter a default so that we can 
5 appeal the issue? 
6 And the Court — the Supreme Court, that can 
7 protect that attorney from an ethical complaint, can 
8 say, no, there should be appointment of counsel, and 
9 Judge Lewis was correct in her ruling that no rescission 
10 will occur, or they may conclude otherwise. But we can 
11 immediately get to the -- to the Supreme Court through a 
12 default judgment and have those issues resolved. 
13 JUDGE LEWIS: I understand your position on 
14 that, 
15 MR. RENCHER: If we appoint counsel, on the 
16 flip side, we have a whole host of other questions that 
17 occur. Who is going to pay for that counsel? 
18 JUDGE LEWIS: Yes, and I'm not sure. Perhaps 
19 a better thing would be to now hear from the other side 
20 and then have you respond. 
21 MR. RENCHER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
22 JUDGE LEWIS: Mr. Parker. 
23 MR. PARKER: Thank you, Your Honor. I have a 
24 bit of a cough and I'll -- I hope that doesnft 
25 interfere. 
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1 Brad Parker appearing for the Montgomerys in 
2 I this case. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Okay. 
MR. PARKER: Let me just respond initially to 
two or three assertions by Mr. Rencher in this case. 
Mr. Rencher is concerned about the case 
proceeding forward and there being an adverse finding 
against Drezga of fraud. And he assumes in his argument 
that if Drezga has defaulted, that there will be no 
adverse finding and that that might somehow be of 
benefit to him. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, I don!t think that part is 
true, and I didn't actually hear Mr. Rencher say that. 
Perhaps I misunderstood. I think a default would be 
would be an avenue for responding. I think 
Mr. Rencher's position is just that it might be easier 
to deal with it in the future than a finding on the 
fact. 
MR. PARKER: Well, and my point is, I believe 
there's going to be a finding on the facts anyway, 
because the Court has recognized the Montgomerys as a 
party --
JUDGE LEWIS: Yes. 
MR. PARKER: -- and is allowing us to go 
forward in this case. And so there's going to be a 
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1 trial that relates to coverage and relates to whether 
2 there was fraud or not, and there's going to be official 
3 findings of the Court or of a jury. 
4 JUDGE LEWIS: Why should I appoint counsel, 
5 Counsel? 
6 MR. PARKER: Well, for the same reason that 
7 Your Honor appointed counsel in the first place, and 
8 that is -- and the same reason it's been done in Utah 
9 and recognized by the Supreme Court. And that is, that 
10 after a claim is made, when the client is not to be 
11 found, the insurance company has placed the client in a 
12 precarious situation by taking advantage of that and 
13 saying, "There's no client, he can't be represented, 
14 let's deny coverage." 
15 And additionally, the insurance company is in 
16 a position, as Your Honor initially found, a superior 
17 position, they have accepted premiums all along the way. 
18 They have counsel and now they're expecting an insured 
19 to hire counsel who usually is not as well situated to 
20 do that in defense. 
21 JUDGE LEWIS: Right. I understand what you're 
22 saying. 
23 MR. PARKER: And we did not — Your Honor, we 
24 haven't been addressing the issue of whether counsel 
25 should be appointed or not. I believe Your Honor 
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1 already decided that. The issue that we have looked at 
2 is whether the fact that Drezga is absent -- and ITm 
3 just referring to your letter of June 12th, whether the 
4 I fact that he is absent makes it unethical for an 
attorney to represent him. 
I think we've already visited the "should 
counsel be appointed" four different times. And so the 
question really here isn't should counsel be appointed 
or should counsel not be appointed. 
JUDGE LEWIS: What do we do now, given that we 
have no counsel? 
MR. PARKER: The question is: Is there an 
ethical problem so that counsel really can't work? And 
let me address that issue. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Okay. 
MR. PARKER: First of all, I would say that 
neither I nor Mr. McConkie have seen this respondent's 
affidavit by Mr. Gruber. I don't know how that 
happened, but I went through and pulled every pleading 
we had in the file and --
JUDGE LEWIS: That's not right. 
Do you have an extra copy of that, 
Mr. Rencher? 
MR. RENCHER: I'll be happy to give him one, 
Your Honor. 
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JUDGE LEWIS: I appreciate it, and we'll make 
some extra copies before everyone leaves. 
MR. PARKER: I think we can respond anyway. 
The question in this case is a question of 
interpretation of the ethical rules. And those ethical 
rules we would urge, Your Honor, need to be interpreted 
in context, because if they're not, they seem to be 
conflicting. The rules on the one hand require that a 
lawyer abide by a client's decision, that the lawyer 
consult with the client, that the lawyer abide by a 
client's decision concerning settlement, that the lawyer 
keep the client reasonably informed. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Right. 
MR. PARKER: And the affidavit by Mr. Gruber 
indicated that there is a clear violation there. 
JUDGE LEWIS: But none of that was likely to 
occur, or had occurred. 
MR. PARKER: Right, but none of that had 
occurred or could occur. 
On the other hand, there is Rule 1.4 -- or 
1.14 that indicates that the client's ability to make an 
informed decision and the lawyer's responsibility can be 
affected by minority, by disability, or for some other 
reason. And that rule is made to help apply these other 
rules in context, supply them in a real life situation. 
L 
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And indeed, that's exactly what has happened 
in this case. Dr. Drezga did not appear in the trial 
court case. He didn't consult with Mr. Slagle in 
settlement negotiations, he didn't consent in any way to 
Mr. Slaegle's defense. There is no signed agreement 
allowing Mr. Slagle to represent him. 
There is a small provision in the policy that 
says that TEC can represent — or can defend 
Dr. Drezga's interests, but it doesn't actually say that 
they can then hire an attorney and it doesn't say who 
the attorney is. 
Now, we're not claiming that David Slagle was 
unethical, but David Slagle ran afoul of the same 
problems that we're claiming here and that is, he 
couldn't consult. He was paid by someone other than the 
client. 
JUDGE LEWIS: How are things any different 
this time? 
MR. PARKER: They're not going to be 
different. He is going to have the same type of 
representation, legal representation, that he had with 
David Slagle. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, then put a lawyer down, if 
I appoint one, in an untenable position. 
MR. PARKER: Well, was David Slagle an 
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1 untenable position? No. David Slagle was in a position 
2 where I believe clearly, under the rules, he's allowed 
3 to step in and represent Drezga, because Drezga -- he 
4 couldn't meet these other portions of the rules because 
5 not of minority, not of disability, not of death, but 
6 I for some other reason. 
JUDGE LEWIS: There is a catch-all. 
8 I MR. PARKER: And what was that some other 
9 I reason? That some other reason was his absence. And 
that catch-all, I believe, is a catch-all that helps us 
here . 
The -- in the affidavits that were filed with 
the Court, I think there were several telling things. 
TEC once said, "Look, let's wait and get an 
ethical opinion from the Bar." 
Gary Sacket, who was the chairman of the 
committee that issues those opinions, said, "Well, no, 
an ethical opinion can't be rendered because we never 
render opinions on cases that are presently sitting in 
the Court." But he said, "If we did render an opinion, 
then" -- and he's the one that has chaired this, I 
think, for 10 years. 
JUDGE LEWIS: For a very long time. 
MR. PARKER: He said, "This isn't even a close 
call. It's not even a close call. This is clearly 
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within the rules and there would be no ethical 
violation." 
JUDGE LEWIS: I think that's helpful. 
MR. PARKER: Dr. Morgan, who doesn't teach at 
BYU, and we gave Your Honor his affidavit, but was the 
distinguished professor at Emery, Dean of the Emery Law 
School, he visited at BYU for a year, and is the author 
of the National Textbook on Ethics. He comes in and 
says, "This isn't a violation. The appointment isn't an 
ethical violation." 
JUDGE LEWIS: Well --
MR. PARKER: And so — 
JUDGE LEWIS: — I'll be candid with you, I'm 
inclined to appoint counsel, but you can continue to 
comment. 
MR. PARKER: Okay. Well, I learned early on, 
Your Honor, when the Court is inclined to rule in one's 
favor, sometimes one just does damage by speaking. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Let me ask you a question, 
Mr. Parker. How would you handle the issue of who that 
attorney is and how payment is to be made? Because I 
think Mr. Rencher has raised two very important 
practical considerations in his arguments. 
MR. PARKER: Let me address that. 
One on -- one of the issues raised by 
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1 Mr. Rencher is that, well, my goodness, we shouldn't be 
2 able to recommend counsel because we're in an adverse 
3 position to Drezga and that should really be TEC' s --
4 JUDGE LEWIS: I would say it should be a 
5 situation where, kind of akin to a divorce case, where 
6 each side can submit four names and then I make a 
7 selection. What about that? 
8 MR. PARKER: We would be happy to do it that 
9 way. 
10 JUDGE LEWIS: Who pays? 
11 MR. PARKER: Let me just say one thing. We 
12 would say that in the present case, our interests are 
13 aligned with Drezga. It's not in Drezga's interest to 
14 have a multirnillion dollar judgment against him because 
15 there's no insurance. 
16 JUDGE LEWIS: I understand, but the bottom 
17 line is that I would rather have -- I'd like to have 
18 Mr. Rencher make some suggestions and you make some 
19 suggestions. And what I'll look at is who I think the 
20 best qualified attorney is to prevail him, not who 
21 recommended the attorneys. 
22 MR. PARKER: We would be happy to do that, 
23 Your Honor. 
24 On the question of who pays, I believe 
25 actually that's also an easy question, Your Honor. When 
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an insurance company hires a defense counsel, that 
defense counsel is to represent a client, not the 
insurance company. And sometimes the client's interests 
are not the same interests as the insurance company. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Right. 
MR. PARKER: So when Mr. Slagle is appointed, 
it might be in the client's interest to try and come in 
and settle the claim, it might be in the client's 
interest to do that early, but it is not especially in 
the insurance company's interest. And so there's a 
friction there because the insurance company, which 
would hope to avoid the claim, may be in a posit 
position to the defense counsel who doesn't represent 
the insurance company, but represents the doctor. 
That same situation exists here. And as the 
Court found previously in the Provo case, and I believe 
cited it in Your Honor's decision, and I can cite to 
that if you wish, there are cases in which the Supreme 
Court has said when somebody pays their premium, they 
believe they have coverage. And it's not a defendant 
who is contesting whether that coverage is there, it's 
the insurance company, after claim is- made, that's 
contesting. Then it's appropriate to have the insurance 
company pay. 
We would say, additionally, it's appropriate 
ROCKIE E. DUSTIN * CSR, RPR 18 
1 
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here because this case goes on for two years before TEC 
ever steps in and says, "Oh, just kidding. There's 
really not coverage." 
JUDGE LEWIS: I understand your position on 
that. 
MR. PARKER: So we would submit it on that, 
Your Honor. 
JUDGE LEWIS: All right. 
Mr. Rencher, youfre entitled to the last word. 
MR. RENCHER: I understand Your Honor has 
indicated her preference for ruling. If I may make a 
record. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Of course. And I J ust 
my inclination. You can say anything you wish, 
could 
right 
always dissuade me. 
MR. RENCHER: Well, one would 
word would surface to do that 
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1 JUDGE LEWIS: Who would you suggest? 
2 MR. RENCHER: I would suggest Michael 
3 Skolnick, Your Honor, and that's whom I did suggest, 
4 JUDGE LEWIS: What's wrong with Mr. Skolnick? 
5 Mr. Skolnick said he wouldn't do it. 
MR. RENCHER: He said he thought it was 
unethical. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, Mr. Skolnick has a right 
to say no. I'm not going to compel any person who has a 
law degree to represent someone when they don't want to. 
Do you have another name or two in mind? 
MR. RENCHER: I will certainly consider them 
and submit them, Your Honor, but my concern is that I 
should, if this is the way the court wants to proceed, 
have a right to object to any names that counsel has 
proposed. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, I guess you have the right 
to object. If you have some names handy I might just 
pick somebody today that you suggested, but I understand 
I'm catching you off guard, as it were. Mr. Skolnick is 
not going to be compelled to represent in this case. Do 
you have anyone else that comes to mind? 
MR. RENCHER: I would be happy to submit those 
names, Your Honor, but this is really a decision for my 
client to make, not a decision for me to make. 
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JUDGE LEWIS: I'm not sure it's your client's 
decision to make. What does your client know about 
counsel, Mr. Rencher? You're very well versed in that. 
I assume your client would turn to you and say, "What do 
you think? Who do you think would be good?" 
MR. RENCHER: I would be happy to submit those 
names, Your Honor, but I really don't know --
JUDGE LEWIS: Is it basically that you are 
going to object to anyone that the other side proposes? 
MR. RENCHER: No, Your Honor, but there are 
certain attorneys that obviously have prior 
relationships with insurance companies generally that 
makes that untenable. 
JUDGE LEWIS: I want you to make a record, but 
before we do, do you have three names in mind, 
Mr. Parker and Mr. McConkie? 
MR. PARKER: Well, one name, obviously, is 
Mr. Glauser. I think his relationship --
JUDGE LEWIS: Rick Glauser? 
MR. PARKER: I think his relationship was 10 
years ago. It doesn't have anything to do with this 
case. 
JUDGE LEWIS: What's wrong with Rick Glauser? 
MR. RENCHER: I believe that my client would 
want to raise a conflict. He's a former partner of 
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1 mine, Your Honor, and I don't think that --
2 JUDGE LEWIS: Did he ever have any interaction 
3 with these parties? 
4 MR. RENCHER: We did represent The Doctors 
5 Company when we were --
6 JUDGE LEWIS: Did he ever do any work for The 
7 Doctors Company? 
8 MR. RENCHER: Well, Your Honor, I wouldn't 
9 know that offhand. I apologize. 
10 JUDGE LEWIS: Okay. Rick Glauser is one of 
11 the names that's tendered. Is there another name? 
12 MR. PARKER: We — actually, we suggested some 
13 other names at one time, Your Honor, and I think we 
14 suggested Paul Burke at Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. 
15 JUDGE LEWIS: What about Paul Burke? 
16 MR. RENCHER: I will have to investigate that, 
17 Your Honor. I do not know Mr. Burke. 
18 JUDGE LEWIS: Do you have any names? Not at 
19 this point? 
20 MR. RENCHER: I would like to have an 
21 opportunity to consult with my client. 
22 JUDGE LEWIS: You do, but Ifd like to get some 
23 idea — if we have a meeting of the minds today, that 
24 would make it a lot simpler. It would avoid one more 
25 d e l a y . 
T>r\niTTT? TT DTTQTTTJ * P ^ p p p # 22 
1 Any other names, Mr. McConkie, Mr. Parker? 
2 Give me one more. 
3 MR. PARKER: We have submitted Danny Berman as 
4 a name, Your Honor. 
5 JUDGE LEWIS: Any problems with Mr. Berman? 
6 MR. RENCHER: Again, Your Honor, I would need 
7 to advise my client — 
8 JUDGE LEWIS: Okay. Advise your client that 
9 three names have been proposed to the Court. The Court 
10 is familiar with Mr. Glauser and Mr. Berman and they are 
11 outstanding lawyers. I don't know Mr. Burke. But I 
12 have no reason to oppose an appointment of any of the 
13 attorneys, but you also have the right to tender three 
14 names. 
15 And all other things being equal, unless you 
16 have failed to tender a name, I will try to pick someone 
17 on your list, but I'm going to give both sides an 
18 opportunity within a week of hearing the names, and you 
19 just heard them, so you have a week to object, to object 
20 to the names offered. And if you object to all three, 
21 I'm going to wonder about how credible it is. I mean, 
22 it would then sound like whoever they suggest you're 
23 opposed to just on principle. 
24 MR. RENCHER: Your Honor, I know those two 
25 other attorneys and I know them to be honorable men. I 
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wouldn't surely object in a frivolous manner. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, I know you wouldn't object 
in a frivolous manner, but if they suggested three names 
and you object to all three --
MR. RENCHER: I haven't suggested that, Your 
Honor, and I would take your statement advisory --
JUDGE LEWIS: All right. Would you like say 
anything else on the record? 
MR. RENCHER: I would, Your Honor. May I 
request a clarification? By when must I tender the 
three names? 
JUDGE LEWIS: I was going to give you the time 
you wanted. How much time do you need? 
MR. RENCHER: Your Honor, I think if I could 
have 10 days that — 
JUDGE LEWIS: Ten days? I'll give you two 
weeks. Two weeks from today seems very fair. Ten days, 
that doesn't give you perhaps as much time as you need. 
That would be October 10th. And then one of the sides 
has until October 17th to object. In the meantime, you 
have until October 3rd to determine whether you object 
to their people. 
If by chance one of the three names they have 
given is not objectionable to you, and it says so in 
writing, that would obviate the necessity for you to 
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1 tender any names, but you certainly have that right. 
2 MR. RENCHER: Well, Your Honor, I may not 
3 object to all of those names, but I would like the Court 
4 to consider nonetheless the names of Dr. --
JUDGE LEWIS: That's fine. I'd be happy to do 
that. 
MR. RENCHER: Because there are obviously 
individuals that have more experience working with 
insurance companies as retained counsel than others, and 
I would like to have that considered. 
JUDGE LEWIS: That may be, but certainly, 
Mr. Berman and Mr. Glauser have a wealth of experience. 
I don't know Mr. Burke. 
MR. RENCHER: If I may, Your Honor, may I make 
a proffer? 
JUDGE LEWIS: Of course. You may say anything 
you wish to me. 
MR. RENCHER: First, Your Honor, the issue of 
who pays is improperly before the Court. I was advising 
the Court that that remains to be the problem. The 
issue of who pays is a contractual or legal relationship 
between an attorney and the insurance company. There 
will be no contractual relationship, I think, that can 
be found. I think there will be no legal relationship 
that Utah law recognizes in this instance with adverse 
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1 parties that can be found. 
2 That should be -- if that is to become a 
3 dispute, it will be a dispute between The Doctors 
4 Company and their attorney. I'm not here to make a 
5 representation as to how they will handle that, but I 
6 caution the parties, my opponents here, that that may 
7 become an issue for future consideration and those 
attorneys may be -- should be properly advised of that. 
JUDGE LEWIS: So noted. 
MR. RENCHER: The other issue, Your Honor, is 
that I apologize to my colleagues for apparently some 
mishap as to why they didn't get this reply affidavit, 
but it shows itfs been filed. And Mr. Gruber very 
eloquently and clearly distinguishes between the Slagle 
situation and this situation. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, if you say it's been 
filed, then I certainly accept your representation. If 
you want to hand that to my clerk at this point, we can 
save a little time. Have her make two copies, one for 
the Court file and one for the other side. 
MR. PARKER: This shows a filing stamp, Your 
Honor, of August 2nd". 
JUDGE LEWIS: I've already told you I 
believe --
MR. RENCHER: August 30th of '02. 
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MR. RENCHER: That is the reply affidavit, 
Your Honor, that counsel indicated he did not receive. 
But it shows a filing stamp of August 30th, I believe. 
But he very eloquently and effectively 
distinguishes what I think is clearly distinguishable in 
the situation with Mr. Slagle and this situation. 
The situation with Mr. Slagle hinges upon an 
insurance contract, an agreement between Dr. Drezga and 
the insurance company that was made at arm's length when 
there was no pending adversarial relationship. And you 
will see, if you consider Mr. Gruber's reply affidavit, 
that that's an entirely different situation than this 
one. 
And the second response issue, Your Honor, is 
that the ethical issue is one that's ultimately going to 
need to be decided by those who govern the ethical 
practice of lawyers. 
JUDGE LEWIS: I think we have that, don't we? 
MR. RENCHER: I think, Your Honor, that the 
Supreme Court is the gatekeeper or the --
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JUDGE LEWIS: I think ultimately the Supreme 
Court will look at the issue, but in the interim, I 
think counsel has done everything they can to get an 
opinion. And we have two as I understand, one from an 
eminent professor and one from — albeit an informal 
one, from someone who sat on that committee. 
MR. RENCHER: And you have an opinion from two 
other members of the Bar, one who disciplined counsel, 
Your Honor, who indicates that it is unethical. And 
Mr. Sacket or the professor's statements to the contrary 
are not going to govern whether the OPC decides to 
prosecute in any given situation. So I guess there is a 
real dilemma here before the Court. 
JUDGE LEWIS: All right. Fair enough. 
MR. RENCHER: The difference between the cases 
that Mr. Parker addressed, or generally the hypothetical 
and this one, is that here you do not know that 
Dr. Drezga wants counsel. That's a marked difference 
from the situation where counsel appears either in 
indigent capacity or in any other capacity. 
JUDGE LEWIS: We don't know anything about Dr. 
Drezga. We don't know whether he wants counsel, but we 
know it's in his best interest, don't we? 
MR. RENCHER: No, we do not, Your Honor. 
JUDGE LEWIS: I see. It's not in his best 
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1 interest to be represented? 
2 MR. RENCHER: I don't think it is, Your Honor, 
3 because the problem relating to that is that he may 
4 rather have a default judgment based upon no knowledge 
5 of the action versus a judgment based upon the fact --
6 JUDGE LEWIS: You're assuming a judgment is 
7 going to enter into, and I think that's an assumption 
8 that one cannot make at this juncture. And I cannot say 
9 that somebody would be happy with a default judgment. 
10 It seems to me that the whole reason we're all 
11 in this business, that is, we all have law degrees, is 
12 based upon the precept that someone who is represented 
13 is more likely to get a fair trial, wouldn't you say, or 
14 a fair adjudication of the issues? 
15 MR. RENCHER: I certainly agree with the 
16 proposition that everyone ought have an attorney or two 
17 on their speed dial list, Your Honor. The difference, 
18 however --
19 JUDGE LEWIS: Well, I don't have it on my 
20 speed dial list. Maybe I'd better make that correction, 
21 Excuse me, Mr. Rencher, go ahead. 
22 MR. RENCHER: The difference here, Your Honor 
23 is that there is a grave problem that arises when you 
24 appoint counsel. 
25 If my memory serves me correctly, and it's 
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been some timef when the issue was raised previously, 
the Court concluded that it would order this counsel to 
accept service or answer that in the complaint. That 
triggers the problem for which Dr. Drezga 
to have counsel. 
JUDGE LEWIS: I understand, and 
may not wish 
I have made a 
determination. I'm going to take this under advisement 
and give it some more thought. And I don 
you're right or wrong, 
interesting points and 
However, the fact that 
ft know whether 
but you've raised some very 
I want to consider them. 
I'm taking this under advisement 
and I may rule either way, I haven't made a decision, , 
should not obviate counsel objecting to the three names 
that have been given an 
because I can't be sure 
two weeks. 
MR. RENCHER: 
d filed with their own names, 
on that opinion within the next 
If I may, Your Honor, let me 
reiterate, I think I have appeared before 
before, I would not all 
attempt by my client to 
raise is inappropriate. 
JUDGE LEWIS: 
ow, nor would I be 
the Court 
party to an 
just say, "Well, any name they 
ti 
Mr. Rencher, your 
in this Court is professional and, further 
never question that. I 
MR. RENCHER: 
know you too well. 
representation 
*, I would 
And I hope that Your Honor knows 
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that I trust Your Honor's judgment in the appointment of 
counsel that I may not know. 
JUDGE LEWIS: I just meant that sometimes 
there is a perception that an attorney has that, as you 
pointed out, that you think you're in a better position, 
a more neutral position, if you will, to select counsel 
than the other side. If I sounded like I was saying 
something else, I misspoke, because your integrity is 
not at issue. 
MR. RENCHER: I frankly believe Your Honor is 
in the best objective position and I trust Your Honor's 
judgement. 
JUDGE LEWIS: That's why I suggested the names 
be tendered to me from both sides and that I just make a 
determination based upon who I think would do a good job 
regardless of who submitted the names, who you would 
suggest. 
MR. RENCHER: I will ask for this 
consideration, for a colleague to be named, if that's 
Your Honor's decision. 
JUDGE LEWIS: What do you mean, "for a 
colleague"? 
MR. RENCHER: If Your Honor decides that there 
will be an appointment of counsel and chooses from the 
names that are submitted, I would ask for this 
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consideration: That that counsel be given an 
opportunity to consider these five affidavits, because I 
think knowingly they come into this with an 
understanding of the other side — 
JUDGE LEWIS: I'm not sure we will ever get an 
attorney if I give an attorney a choice. I think this 
is a situation where Ifm happy to provide an attorney 
with all five opinions, so he or she does not run afoul 
of any ethical duties that they might have, but I would 
be ordering an attorney to be on board. 
MR. RENCHER: I understand. I just would like 
eyes open, Your Honor, as to the affidavits. 
JUDGE LEWIS: I will, as to the affidavits. 
MR. RENCHER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Thank you, Mr. Rencher. 
MR. PARKER: Thanks, Your Honor. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Thank you, Mr. Parker and 
Mr. McConkie. We're in recess. 
(Whereupon the Proceeding Concluded.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Klectronically recorded on January 31, 2003) 
THE COURT: Let me indicate that we are hare this 
morning in connection with Doctor's Company vs. Dresga, et al, 
95>QQ045?.7. It looks like Mr. Parker and Mr. McConkie ara here 
on behalf of tha defendant and Mr* Rencher is her© on behalf of 
the plaintiff. 
MR. RANCHER: Tired of my presence, your Honor. 
THK COURT: I bog your pardon? 
MR. RKNCHERi Tired of my presence. 
THE COURTi Okay, Wall, I'll be honcat with you, 
gentleman. I thought we had the matter resolved. 
MR. RENCHER; As did I, your Honor. 
THE COURT: So what is the difficulty here? 
MR. MCCGNKIK: I think, your Honor--
THE COURT: Mr. McConkio? 
MR. MCCONKIE: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Rancher has 
hci.m in trial— 
THE COURT: Could I get you to stand at tho podium? 
MR. MCCONKIE: Sure. 
THE COURT: You know with this video equipment it's 
hard to g^t a picture or a voice. 
MR. MCCONKIE: Okay, thank you. Mr, Rencher 
Admittedly has been in trial, although I've been working with 
hir uSLiicteint, and we thought wa had an order put together 
-3-
v/hich wo both could agree on. I didn't get it, so I thought 
•Lho bonz thing to do wac to try ftnd clarify the situation with 
thu Court because — to expedite matters. 
THE COURT; Okay. 
MK. MCCONKIE; Basically this is what wc proposed, and 
.I'll lot: Mr, Tienchor speak to whatever position he would like 
lo cako this morning. 
My understanding when I was speaking with vaun is that 
thora would not be a sharp objection to appointing Paul Burke, 
who works over at Rfty, Quinncy and Nebeker. 
THE C0UXT; Right, I had understood that initially as 
Wtfll. 
MR. MCCOHKIE: If that's still the cacc then that's 
Luttled and w# can put that into an order. 
TIIJG COURT: Lot TOO stop you then now. Mr. Rencher, do 
you hnv*. nn objection to Mr. Burke? 
MK. RENCHEK; Your Honor, the Doctor's Company 
r.ittiT)tains its objection to the appointment of any Counsel. 
They recognize the Court has so ordered it, and that can be 
rci'lrctod in the Court's order. What I had inquired about is 
thnt when w£ vftro last here, your Honor, I believe, indicated 
that whomever would be appointed would be given the opportunity 
to ix*v\ tho briefing as to the ethical issues on both sides, I 
Wttnt'rd to contact Mr. Burke without it being objectionable to 
nuika hliM cvware~~ 
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tfHJE COURT: I would suggest that the more appropriate 
Urvy to handle it would b& to send him a letter• Both sides may 
fc'Wl him a letter and then you're to cc ons another so that 
neilthor one of you is ever accused of doing or saying something 
yovi didn't do or say. 
Yau each will have an opportunity to write a letter, 
but 3 fit me ask you the question we started with. Are you 
closed to Mr. Burke? 
MR. RF'NCHER; In our paperwork, your Honor, we 
ftoknowJudge to the Court that wo did not know whether Mr. Burke 
hid had experience representing doctors in licensing lawsuits-— 
THE COURT: I don't know whether ha has or not, but 
h^'s a good 3&wyer, and more importantly, he'3 willing to do it 
and was very gracious about it. So do you or do you not havo 
an objection? 
MR, RENCHER: Wo have an objection to any Counsel 
being Appointed— 
THE COURT: You've already said that, and now having 
noted that and respecting that and making sure that that 
aj-.p^ra in the order, now you know that I'm going to appoint 
coinrrjnes, do you have any objection against Mr. Burke? 
MR- RJENCHJfclRj I have no basis known to mo upon which 
tn objnot to Mr. Burke. 
TUB COURT: Is that a nor you don't object? 
MR. RENCH7:R: I don't havo a basis to object, your 
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fJonor, except for what I've already mads a record of. So no, I 
wouldn't object to Mr. Burke, given your Honor's rulings, 
1 I THE COURT: Okay. 
d I MR, RKNCHE'R: There is an issue that remains to bo 
5 brictc-d, 
6 THE COURT: All right, and that is? 
7 MR. REKCHl^Rj Well, Mr. McConkie and I have informally 
fj discussed that someone should adviso Mr. Burke that he should 
3 not rely upon the Doctor's Company to pay his fee. I do not— 
10 THE COURT: Wall, he raised the iscuo with my clerk. 
11 Obviously I've had no contact with him about how he is to be 
12 paid. Uaw iu ho to be paid? 
13 MU. RENCHER: Well, your Honor, as we believe, this 
14 ought to be a matter that'g briefed to the Cour't and isn't 
ID proaontly before the Court, but that the Supramo Court is clear 
16 that unless there's a contractual, a statutory or a caco law 
17 bftcLs, you cannot impose attorney's fees, and there in no 
IB contractual, statutory or wo believo case law basis to force 
19 thci Doctor's Company to pay fees. 
?0 THE COURT; So in other words, you don't really want 
21 an attomoy appointed. You're clear on that. If one is 
22 Appointed you don't know that you have any reason to object to 
?3 Mr. $utko, but you don't want to pay. 
21 Mil, PJENCHER: Well, I — if he wants to appear 
J$ voluntarily--
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THE COURT: Wall, what kind of fool would ho be if he 
did that? 
MR. RENCHER: I agree, your Honor. 
THE COURT* He is a vory gracious gentleman„ My cl^rk 
has indicated he has been extremoly cooperative because we've? 
cal,lod and said, "Wo, they don't want you* Yes, they do want 
you. Mo, thr-y don't want you." It's been ridiculous, quite 
fr<>/ikly. 
Ho has raised the issue about f&es. Ha said he'll do 
wh^tover is required/ but I'm not going to bring in a lawyer 
f\ncl not provido for him to be paid or her to be paid, I think 
thttt'n wrong* It seems to me that it's an expense that ought 
to bo borne equally by both sides. 
Do you want to speak to T:hat, Mr. McConkifc? 
MR. MCCOMKIE: I think we've actually briefed this 
incue, your Honor. In the case that the Court reliod upon to 
appoint Counsel in the first place, the Court appointed 
Counsel, and my recollection is that they also paid the 
attorney* It just went — it was just — went hand in glovo. 
THE COURT: That was my understanding as woll, 
MR. MCCONKIE: So I don't know that it would bo fair 
to divide that burden when tho situation is as it is today, a 
prison who hay been insured by their company and is now in an 
advuvae position to PBC. Wo would just simply ask the Court to 
follow the precedent in that case, have thorn pay, and then move 
-7 
forward. 
Our concern is the time, und Mr. Renchor has of course 
gono up to rho Supreme Court and back and it's taken time, but 
ho'n car thinly had an opportunity to contest all of theso 
isuuo$. 
THE COURT: I think he's mado his position clear, 
which I apprcxeiacn. Mr, Rancher is always very able in terms 
of; sotting forth what his concerns are, which is helpful to me, 
I am going to go ahead and appoint Counsel. X'm going to 
Appoint Mr. Burke and he is to be paid in the manner you 
suggest. 
MH, MCCONKIE: All right, thank you. 
THE COURT: Now I ask you, Mr. McConkie, prepare the 
orJnr. In the body of it if you would please reflect that 
Mr, Rcucher is opposed to the appointment of Counsel in general 
and has articulately spoken to this issue, but that as to 
Mr. mirk* himself/ there is no specific objection, correct? 
MH. RftNCHERi Yes, your Honor, but I do have a problem 
if I iTKiy make a record. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR, RENCHftR: I believe the Doctor's Company will 
rofuoo to pay his fee.c, and that's — 
THE COURT: Why? 
MR, RENCiJKR: —the subject of what should be "a 
i;r.*parat'e action between Mr. Burke and the Doctor's Company. 
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Th&y have no legal basis to pay the fees- So if we arc going 
Co go forward with an order without briefing on that issue, 
thffl I U'sod sora© directioni 
TUB COURT; Wf*ll, hare' s what we'll d o — 
MIL &ENCHEJI: If the Court is going to hold him in 
fi I contempt and dismiss tho cace— 
7 THE COURT*. I'm not. you know, I'm not a judge who 
0 l.ikG5 to hold people in contempt routinely. I try ro figure 
,9 out other ways of resolving things. Here is my suggestion. 
10 Wo'11 go forward as I've indicated, and you may file an 
11 objection or a request for hoaring and Mr. McConkio can 
12 r^^pondr and I will look at it again, 
}3 At this point I'm interested in getting the ball 
14 rolling, and so my ruling today is baced upon that, However, 
13 if fesM are paid and I later look at the briefing and find that 
IC that was an improper ruling on my part, I'll wake sure that 
17 Lhoy'*o repaid from some other source, 
18 MR. RI£NCHKH: tfour Honor may recall that I volunteered 
ID this information long before it became an issue-
20 TH1-; COUHT: You volunteered what information? 
21 MTU REttCHER: That the Doctor's Company may rofuse to 
22 pay foe.**. 
?3 THE COURT: I'm woll aware that they'll bo paying the 
24 foo3, and I'm not going to hold them in contempt, I'm just 
25 o^irig to order them to pay the fees. 
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MR. KEMCHER: Thoy havo indicated they will not pay 
tho loer,, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well/ they haven't hoard that I'vo 
ordorcd, have they? 
Mil, RENCH.RR: Thoy have hoard that — 
TH£ COURT: If that'3 tho case then you better talk to 
your client about Court orders, and toll them that thero is a 
possibility that I will revisit tho issue and make a different 
ruling. Hut right now thoy're going no pay them. 
As I ndid, I don't want to hold anyone in contempt, 
X'vo m/ver had to in a Dotting like this. I would suspect that 
if you tell thrift they have to pay the fees based upon a valid 
Court order they'll pay them. 
MR. KENCHKRs I don't think so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why is that? You have no control over 
your clin-ut? 
MR. RENCHER: I have spoken to their corporate legal, 
your Honor. Thoy refuse to pay the fees. So I will tell thero 
your Honor has ordered it, but it will bring this back hero— 
IDE COURT: You know what, w« are on like the fifth or 
sixth volume in this case. It'5 ridiculous. It coems to me 
clva wa'va gotten to tho point where Counsel can't agree on the 
oojor of tho sky, and I am tired of it, and I am interested in 
moving this ensra along, I'm noc blaming one side or the other, 
but 1 have issued an order that I would like to sign today or 
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tomonow. 
If your client fails to comply I guess you're right/ 
contempt sanctions will bo in ordor/ but I would hopo that you 
would havt* come control over your clients, or that the person 
who heads up their legal department/ who I assume is a lawyer, 
would understand that when a Court order is in effect it means 
co bo tjubjfect to compliance. 
If that does not occur it's not going to look very 
good to mo in terror. o£ the, plaintiff's actions, number one. 
Number two, I'll order thorn to pay it and th&y will pay it. If 
chat requires/ as you've pointed out, which s$eras ridiculous, 
contempt sanctions, so ho it, 
MR. RENCHEH: I understand your Honor's position. 
THE COURT: Thoy ought to be taking their marching 
ordrtra from you. You'r© their attorney* 
MR. Rli'NCIIER: Your Honor, I understand your Honor's 
position. I think it also ought to be acknowledged that lrir\ 
tho ore who voluntarily so advised the Court and Counsel. I 
have not been playing a (inaudible), 
THE COUKT: I'm well uwara you've advised them — 
advisod ua, Mr. Renchor- You've acted with your usual 
piofcssionalism in this case* The problem is not whether you 
told us or not. The problem is I need to know what's going to 
happen on funding, end so does this attorney. 
Mr. Burkfl is not doing pro bono work hero, and so what 
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i I'm tailing you is toll your client that if they don't pay 
2 l-hcy'ro goincf to bo held in contempt. 
3 MR. RTHMCnER: I will, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT; I would have liked to put it more 
5 dr-ljeatcly, but apparently that's what's required because every 
6 thno I say to you, "Please urge them to pay," you're saying 
7 they'll not going to pay. Well, maybe the chiof of the legal 
8 ilcparlw^nt noeda to como into court when you file your 
9 objection- In tho meantime tho foes better be paid* 
10 Wlif.'A h o corner into court tell him to bring a 
11 tooihbxu^h, as they say, because if a court order has no impact 
12 on people, they don't respect: the law, I have great trouble 
13 with that. 
34 MK. RENCHER: As do I, your Honor, but as your Honor 
\b 3JL* dWt\t(j, there are occasions whan clients don't always follow 
J 6 tho advice pro or con of their legal Counsel. I respect your 
17 Honor.--
IS THE COURT: On the other hand, I think you are a very 
3 9 persuasive advocate, and an intelligent man who carefully 
?0 communicates what'? important, I would be very surprised, 
? 1 ftankly, if you do nor havo far more control ovpr your clients 
22 than you muy think because I think you're very compelling when 
<'J one- lutons to you-
?4 MR. RENCHER: I just think someone needs to advise 
?D Mr. P/urko that at some point in the game— 
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TIJE COURT: Mr. Burk© is well aware of it, Ha raised 
the icouf.^  He said, "I will do whatever you want, your Honor," 
kind of the. phrase I like to hear, not putting up a bunch of 
impediment. \lo didn't say it directly to me, h© said it to 
Michelle. Just so we're clear, I didn't talk to him- He said, 
"Tell the Judge I'm willing to do whatever she wants me to do. 
I am concerned about whether I'll be paid," to which Michelle 
said, "We don't know what the source of the payment will be, 
bun yon will be paid." That's where it stands. 
MR- RKNCHER: What I'm suggesting, your Honor, is 
Mr. imrke needs to be aware that there may be a point in time 
if my client pays the fees where his firm will have to remit 
nil of thoaa fees back. 
THE COURT.' Didn't you hear what I just said? 
MR. RENCHER: I did, your Honor, 
TOE COURT: That Mr» Burke is aware of the problem, 
that I have assured Mr, Burke that someone will be paying for 
th/i fees, that while we have told him, "No, we don't need you, 
Yos, wo need you. No, we don't need you. Yes, wo need you," 
that *it this point in time we'll call him again and tell him we 
do need him. 
1 think quite frankly, the fees for Mr. Burke and the 
tot??* in general in this case are going to be about ten times 
what thoy need to bo becauso Counsel can't seem to agree on 
anything, and I think it's time to start agreeing on somo of 
-13-
thr^ ri simple matters -
MR. KENCHEft: X don't think it's Counsel, your Honor, 
I think it's tho party and— 
THE! COURT: Wall, hopefully Counsel has control over 
the* rcliontc. 
MR. p.ENCHER: Mr. McConkie and I get along famously, 
and cor t r i jn ly— 
THIS COURT: T h a t ' s what I assume. 
MR. RKNCHER: —X have the. utmost respect for his 
difoiliti^ r*. I don't rhink there's any problem i n — 
THE COOKT: There's a great deal of respect in this 
crisn that the Court has for Counsel and that Counsel has for 
one cinothor, and I'm not in any way suggesting, Mr. Rencher, 
rhat you are tho problem or that Mr. McConkie is the problem. 
hXl I'm saying is a lot of paperwork has gone back and 
ioith, and I would like from this point forward for you to do 
what you can to exercise a little bit more control over your 
cliotxt. 
MR, RENCHER: I'll advise thorn of your Honor's ruling. 
MR. MCCONKIE: Thank you, your Honor. We'll have an 
order over to you today. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McConkie.. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 | JUDGE LEWIS: Gentlemen, this seemed 
4 | appropriate to hear in chambers. Itfs quite a 
5 I complicated motion, although Ifm happy to hear anything 
6 both sides have to say. 
7 We are here in the matter of Doctors Company 
8 vs. Drezga, Judd, et al., itfs 990904537. And I have 
9 reviewed the pleadings, in fact many of them have been 
10 pending for some time. Wefve had to reschedule the 
11 hearing. So I?m cognizant of this issue, which has been 
12 before me in essence for a very long time. 
13 And it is obviously the plaintiff's motion to 
14 stay the appointment of counsel for Dr. Drezga. And we 
15 had an order for appointment, an order to appoint signed 
16 in August, I believe August 9th of this year. So let me 
17 hear from whoever wishes to speak to the issue, 
18 Mr. Rencher? 
19 MR. RENCHER: Yes, Your Honor, Jaryl Rencher 
20 on behalf of The Doctors Company. I appreciate the 
21 Court considering this this morning. 
22 The most recent order that I'm aware of that 
23 the Court has signed relative to this issue is an 
24 October 3rd order based upon a stipulation, signed by 
25 parties1 counsel, extending this requirement for 
1 appointment of counsel until December 31st, if the Court 
2 denies my motion today, or 30 days from the date the 
3 Court might deny it, should that be the Court's 
4 I determination. 
JUDGE LEWIS: That's fine. 
6 1 MR. RENCHER: And I appreciate plaintiff's 
7 counsels' cooperation as the Court's schedule has 
8 I necessitated some extensions on this. 
JUDGE LEWIS: As do I. 
10 I MR. RENCHER: The key issue here — let me 
11 suggest, Your Honor, what the key issue is not and then 
12 what the key issue is with my client's motion. 
13 The key issue is not should the Court consider 
14 this stay based upon the likelihood of the Supreme Court 
15 granting a Rule 65(b) extraordinary writ. While that 
16 has been suggested by the defense as part of their 
17 opposition, that's a consideration for the appellate 
18 court. 
19 JUDGE LEWIS: Uh-huh. 
20 MR. RENCHER: I would think that if the 
21 defendants' argument is sound, that is, hypothetically, 
22 that this is not a 65 -- does not merit a 65(b) writ, 
23 the appellate court will quickly so find. So I would 
24 request that as the Court consider this, it not factor 
25 in, is this a case that merits appeal at this juncture? 
4 
1 The issue, as I see it, and as my client 
2 proposes it, Your Honor, is does -- do the issues 
3 surrounding the Court's discretion to grant a stay, to 
4 allow an appellate court to consider Your Honor's 
5 rulings, outweigh the defense's suggestion that there 
6 ought to be immediate appointment of counsel pursuant to 
7 the Court's order, and a continuation of this case? 
8 And these are the things that The Doctors 
9 Company would like Your Honor to consider: First and 
10 foremost, Your Honor, there are four decisions that the 
11 Court has made which impact upon this motion to say, 
12 The first is that the Court must -- The Doctors Company 
13 must retain counsel for Dr. Drezga who is not here. 
14 JUDGE LEWIS: Not here today. 
15 MR. RENCHER: The second is that the Court has 
16 to date refused to grant default judgment on 
17 Dr. Drezga's nonappearance in the action based upon the 
18 first complaint. 
19 The third issue is that, at least currently, 
20 The Doctors Company has been denied its request to 
21 republish the amended complaints in order to seek 
22 follow-up default judgment, and the Court has indicated 
23 that would be reconsidered if counsel is appointed. 
24 JUDGE LEWIS: Right. And that's the very 
25 essence. 
5 
MR. RENCHER: And the fourth issue is that 
2 I the -- I think the dispositive one, perhaps, for this 
3 case, is that no insurance company has a right to 
4 rescind coverage if there is an injured third party. 
5 JUDGE LEWIS: Well, we're not really getting 
6 to that issue today, as I understand it. We're dealing 
7 I with a much more limited issue. 
MR. RENCHER: I agree, Your Honor, but it does 
impact upon the motion for this reason: If the Court 
denies the stay and counsel is ordered to appear, 
because there is no intervention from an appellate 
court, that counsel for Dr. Drezga, retained by The 
Doctors Company, will either choose not to answer the 
complaint or will choose to answer the complaint. Let 
me show you why those four issues are relevant to this 
stay -- the stay decision. 
There are legitimate reasons that I can 
foresee as defense counsel in many, many cases for a 
doctor, including doctors who are unable to answer on 
their own behalf, where retained defense counsel for 
Dr. Drezga may refuse to answer the complaint. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Why? 
MR. RENCHER: For example, Your Honor, in this 
case, if Dr. Drezga does not answer, and a default 
judgment is ultimately awarded, there have been no 
6 
1 findings by a jury or by the Court, necessarily, that 
2 Dr. Drezga has committed fraud- If, however --
3 JUDGE LEWIS: That's why I want counsel on 
4 board. That's why I'm going to ask that he enter the 
5 file. 
6 MR. RENCHER: And my concern, Your Honor, is 
7 that there is a legitimate reason for --
8 JUDGE LEWIS: I think you're anticipating 
9 something that's not your call. 
10 MR. RENCHER: But -- I realize that, Your 
11 Honor, but I'm using this for illustrative purposes to 
12 show why a notion to stay is appropriate. 
13 JUDGE LEWIS: Essentially, you had a stay. I 
14 mean, this has been pending for months. 
15 MR. RENCHER: Well, I recognize that, Your 
16 Honor, except that we did not know when the Court first 
17 postponed the originally set hearing that we would have 
18 this length of time. 
19 JUDGE LEWIS: As you pointed out in the 
20 stipulation and order that was signed on or about 
21 October 3rd, certainly made it clear to you that you had 
22 an amount of time in which --
23 MR. RENCHER: At least until December 31st. 
24 JUDGE LEWIS: Right. 
25 MR. RENCHER: As the Court is aware, 
however --
JUDGE LEWIS: That's another month. 
3 I MR. RENCHER: -~ the appellate rules require 
4 that we first seek leave from this Court before we seek 
5 leave from an appellate court. I think our respect for 
6 this Court, aside from those rules, dictates that we 
7 request that Your Honor consider the additional stay so 
8 that this can be properly briefed. 
9 The point I was trying make, to go back to the 
10 issue, is if counsel makes what I think is a fair 
11 argument for why an answer should not be filed, of those 
12 four issues, three of them are --
13 JUDGE LEWIS: Make the argument that they 
14 should not be filed? That would be up to the other 
15 side. 
16 MR. RENCHER: Right. 
17 JUDGE LEWIS: If you're hypothesizing or 
18 guessing as to what they're going to do, how can you do 
19 that? I mean, don't we need to go through the process 
20 and see what occurred? We're trying to anticipate 
21 something that I don't think we can fairly anticipate. 
22 It's not your job or mine, Mr. Rencher. My job, as I 
23 see it, is to give Dr. Drezga an opportunity to do what 
24 he wishes to do through counsel, with counsel's 
25 assistance. 
8 
1 MR. RENCHER: What I'm suggesting, Your Honor, 
2 I'm not asking to you make any ruling on whether counsel 
3 is going to be forced to make an answer. What I'm 
4 trying --
5 JUDGE LEWIS: I'm not ruling on that. I'm 
6 just ruling on the issue of whether or not counsel 
7 should be appointed. We should move forward. And I 
8 guess what I am understanding, Mr. Rencher, is how does 
9 that hurt you? 
10 MR. RENCHER: Let me suggest, Your Honor, that 
11 regardless of whether The Doctors Company is granted a 
12 stay -- if the Court says no stay, of those four key 
13 issues, three of them will be unresolved, whether an 
14 answer is filed and an answer is not filed. 
15 JUDGE LEWIS: And it has to be done 
16 incrementally. We can't say this is what we guess will 
17 happen if we do the following, until we resolve all of 
18 them today and skip that one. 
19 MR. RENCHER: No, my suggestion, Your Honor, 
20 to use this analysis, is to show you that a stay -- the 
21 benefits of the stay outweigh the detriments to a stay. 
22 The benefit of a stay is that we will know in 
23 short order whether the Supreme Court will grant a 
24 petition for extraordinary relief. If they don't, there 
25 has been a minimal delay to this underlying — to this 
9 
1 issue and these — that are ultimately going to be 
2 outweighed and dispositive. 
3 JUDGE LEWIS: But if I'm representing the 
4 defendant, that seems to me to impede the equity of the 
5 process. 
6 1 MR. RENCHER: I'm not sure how that would on 
appeal, Your Honor, but my suggestion is that the 
prejudice to the plaintiffs in this, The Doctors 
Company, outweigh any prejudice to the defense. 
JUDGE LEWIS: You have asked me to appeal at a 
later time. Once counsel is on board, you can still 
make the same motion. You can still take whatever steps 
you deem appropriate and approach me again, but this is 
a step that seems to me must occur before you can do 
that. 
MR. RENCHER: Well, the difference is, Your 
Honor, that the prejudice starts once The Doctors 
Company is forced to retain counsel -- once they retain 
counsel. 
JUDGE LEWIS: How? 
MR. RENCHER: There are extraordinary fees 
that are going to take place for that attorney who is 
retained to represent Dr. Drezga. 
JUDGE LEWIS: The costs of litigation. 
MR. RENCHER: I acknowledge that, Your Honor, 
10 
1 but when you weigh that against the fact that the 
2 underlying malpractice case, which has gone to a 
3 judgment, is already on appeal --
4 JUDGE LEWIS: I understand. 
5 MR. RENCHER: — and the interest is already 
6 accruing, there isn't any greater likelihood that that 
7 appeal is going to be dismissed tomorrow so that that 
8 amount can be collectable. And the -- we should give 
9 some deference to the fact that there are extraordinary 
10 costs involved to The Doctors Company if theyfre 
11 required to retain counsel. 
12 JUDGE LEWIS: Ifve considered that. I've also 
13 considered the other aspects of this matter. The cost 
14 is not the primary thing I've considered, but in 
15 fairness to all the parties, cost is one minor component 
16 of that. 
17 MR. RENCHER: I recognize that, Your Honor. 
18 The Doctors Company suggests, however, that in light of 
19 the Court's ruling, which imposes upon them a potential, 
20 and not in just this case, but in every policy they 
21 have, evaluating whether they're going to underwrite the 
22 policy, whether they had to do additional investigation 
23 on the policy because of the ruling in this case. That 
24 is not just a cost issue, that's an insurability issue 
25 from any other positions. 
11 
1 JUDGE LEWIS: I don't view it that way. I 
2 just view it as a matter of equity that all parties 
3 need. 
4 MR. RENCHER: And I respect the Court's 
5 ruling. I would suggest again that The Doctors Company 
6 is in a position where they're being required to retain 
7 counsel for someone who has not requested it, who is in 
8 default to this Court, or in a position of default, and 
9 where this Court often does not require a party to pay 
10 for a defaulting party's counsel when there is no 
11 insurance involved. I assume the Court grants default 
12 judgments every day where there hasn't been — 
13 JUDGE LEWIS: Certainly, but I also look at 
14 the equities in determining whether or not people with 
15 representation would be taking difference actions. And 
16 I believe they have the right to — this appears to be a 
17 situation where representation would be helpful. 
18 And I don't think it interferes with any of 
19 your remedies whatsoever. I suppose you could seek 
20 reimbursement on the fees or whatever you deem 
21 appropriate at a later time. Is there anything besides 
22 fees that you're arguing prejudices you? 
23 MR. RENCHER: Yes, Your Honor, and that was 
24 the argument that I made about the impact of this 
25 Court's ruling on other policies, on the way The Doctors 
1 Company does business — 
2 JUDGE LEWIS: I guess I donft see that. 
3 MR. RENCHER: -- for other insurance --
4 JUDGE LEWIS: I see this as being a ruling 
i 
5 limited to this case and the facts of this case. 
6 MR. RENCHER: I see no prejudice to the Judds 
7 that result from the fact that they already have a case 
8 pending on appeal. 
9 JUDGE LEWIS: Ifm not talking about the Judds. 
10 MR. RENCHER: And I see -- I realize the Court 
11 is trying to protect an absent party, but that party has 
12 chosen not to respond --
13 JUDGE LEWIS: Do you know that? 
14 MR. RENCHER: -- to publication that has 
15 occurred over seven weeks for — on behalf of The 
16 Doctors Company, and three or four weeks on behalf the 
17 Judds. 
18 The presumption is, in allowing service by 
19 publication, that that puts him on notice. 
20 JUDGE LEWIS: I understand your position. 
21 MR. RENCHER: And our argument is he has 
22 chosen, while being put on adequate notice, not to 
23 respond. And The Doctors Company doesn!t believe that 
24 there's going to be a significant prejudice in allowing 
25 the Supreme Court the brief period of time which they 
13 
1 will take to determine whether this is a petition they 
2 believe has any merit. If they don't — 
3 JUDGE LEWIS: What if they kick it back for 
4 appointment of counsel? 
5 MR. RENCHER: We've lost, I assume, at most a 
6 few months. 
7 I JUDGE LEWIS: Which we don't have to lose if 
we take that step and then you follow through on other 
remedies you have got. 
MR. RENCHER: I don't see how they're 
prejudiced, how anyone is prejudiced by a few months, 
Your Honor, because --
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, aside from --
MR. RENCHER: The party that's going to take 
the financial potential out of this case is already on 
appeal. The Doctors Company is prejudiced if they're 
not given those three months, because we may be going --
litigating for another year on this case before we have 
our Rule 4 automatic right to appeal, at which time we 
have --
And again, I realize it's a financial issue, 
but we have fees and costs that are never reimbursable 
by a defendant who has either secreted himself or has 
forever left the jurisdiction or fallen off the face of 
the earth. There's no way. 
14 
1 JUDGE LEWIS: Do you have any reason to 
2 believe that thatfs happened with Dr. Drezga, that he 
3 has fallen off the face of the earth, has secreted 
4 I himself? 
MR. RENCHER: The Judds filed a motion before 
6 I the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, which Judge Wilkinson 
7 said — I cannot paraphrase it verbatim, Your Honor, but 
8 it basically said there had been reasonable efforts to 
9 locate him and he may be avoiding service of process. 
10 JUDGE LEWIS: Well, even if that were 
11 precisely what the order says, and I haven't read it and 
12 I'm not discounting what you say, but that's not the 
13 same as offering someone the right to counsel and then 
14 seeing shakes out. 
15 I mean, what it basically means is you assume 
16 all people read papers like the Salt Lake Commercial 
17 Record to see if they're being sued. And I just don't 
18 think that's a reasonable assumption. I'm well aware of 
19 what the law provides. 
20 Anything else, Mr. Rencher, that you want to 
21 call to my attention? You'll have the last word. 
22 MR. RENCHER: I'll wait for that last word, 
23 Your Honor. I understand the Court's position. Thank 
24 you. 
25 MR. PARKER: Your Honor, Brad Parker appearing 
here for the Judds in this case. 
2 I We obviously oppose the motion. I hadn't 
3 prepared to address the issue of the default and the 
4 publication and the insured's right to rescind. I think 
5 those have all been briefed and discussed in the other 
6 motions. And so I really have just limited my 
7 preparation, although I believe I can still speak to 
8 those if I need to, but to the pending motion --
9 JUDGE LEWIS: Well, actually, that's all I'm 
10 dealing with today. 
11 MR. PARKER: We would urge, of course, Your 
12 Honor should deny the motion. I believe we explained in 
13 a fairly straightforward manner in our brief, but we 
14 believe the motion should be denied for two reasons. 
15 One, that there is very little chance, we 
16 believe, of this matter being considered on appeal. It 
17 does not -- the plaintiff has forfeited the right for 
18 interlocutory review, didn't ask for that within the 
19 appropriate time, the 20-day period. 
20 The Rule 65 (b) review is only available by 
21 statute if there is no other remedy. And indeed, the 
22 Tyler case, which the plaintiff cites, refers to a case 
23 in which there was another remedy, the interlocutory 
24 appeal, that the party let run and then came in and 
25 tried for a 65-day and the Court said, "No. You had 
16 
1 another remedy. You chose not to avail yourself of it. 
2 And you can't come in after you've let statutes run, 
3 J time periods run, and come in and say now we think we 
4 want to do a 65(b) appeal." 
5 And so the other remedies are available, but 
6 they've been allowed to lapse. That's one requirement 
7 that I don't believe they can get over. 
8 And the second requirement, additionally, is 
9 that the only ground is for abuse of judicial 
10 discretion. And our reading of the case law is, is that 
11 this is not the type of judicial discretion that is 
12 reviewable. Courts require parties to pay fees all the 
13 time in domestic cases. 
14 It's probably the easiest analogy, where 
15 parties, during the pendency of the action, husbands are 
16 ordered to pay fees, or wives are ordered to pay fees, 
17 and you don't stop the whole thing and send it up and 
18 down on appeal on issues like this, only to have it 
19 appealed at a later date. And we don't feel this is the 
20 type of judicial discretion that is appealable. 
21 Our second reason for opposing the motion is 
22 we do think that this matter is prejudicial both to 
23 Drezga, who we don't represent, but also to the Judds. 
24 We represent a young boy who is in school who is in need 
25 of assistance. The appeal that is up on appeal is an 
appeal dealing with the cap, essentially. But there is 
an amount lower than the cap — 
JUDGE LEWIS: That has been adjudicated. 
MR. PARKER: -- that isn't in question. There 
is no question about the validity of the judgment up to 
the cap and of the special damages. The cap is just 
general damages. 
And so to put this matter off where I think — 
I think Your Honor's initial ruling was in May, and now 
we're six months later --
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, that's in large part the 
Court's foul up because of scheduling conflicts. 
Nevertheless, you're correct in your timing. 
MR. PARKER: But if it takes three months, and 
in my experience it would take longer, to run this 
matter up and down through the appellate court, this is 
the type of thing that can be again straightened out. 
The loss of appeal, when there is an final order, is not 
terminated in this matter and we will oppose it for 
those reasons. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Mr. McConkie, would you like to 
add anything? 
MR. McCONKIE: No, Your Honor. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Mr. Rencher? 
MR. RENCHER: A clarification perhaps is in 
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1 order, Your Honor. I wasn't requesting that the Court 
2 I to reconsider --
JUDGE LEWIS: I understand that. 
4 I MR. RENCHER: -- or argue against it's 
5 previous ruling. My suggestion was that denying the 
6 stay is not going to remove those appealable issue. 
7 JUDGE LEWIS: I understand. 
MR. RENCHER: That clearly addresses and 
refutes any suggestion by the Judds of prejudice. Their 
guess is that if the stay is not granted and we proceed 
with counsel and we go through this process, that 
somehow those amounts below the cap are going to be 
paid. They're not. It's still going to take a full 
appeal after this court is fully finished with the 
litigation. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Well, not if the litigation is 
reached. 
MR. RENCHER: But that's as much guessing --
JUDGE LEWIS: That's always an option. 
MR. PARKER: Not if Drezga is located. 
MR. RENCHER: That's as much guessing as 
suggesting that Dr. Drezga's retained counsel may choose 
not to answer the question. 
JUDGE LEWIS: I'm not into guessing. I'm into 
making rulings based upon what I perceive the law is and 
1 
1 anything that happens, 
2 MR. RENCHER: And my suggestion is the 
3 plaintiff's presentation of prejudice is guesswork. 
4 Secondly, Your Honor, whether or not this is 
5 appropriate --
6 JUDGE LEWIS: You say the plaintiff's 
7 presentation? 
8 MR. RENCHER: Of guesswork is pure -- of 
9 prejudice is pure guesswork. How could denying the stay 
10 speed up their chance for payment of all amounts that 
11 are not being considered on appeal in the underlying 
12 malpractice action, absent a settlement? They're 
13 guessing that it will precipitate a settlement, because 
14 absent that settlement, this case will be long and drawn 
15 out and still require these four issues to be addressed 
16 on appeal. 
17 JUDGE LEWIS: You're presuming, though, when 
18 you say that, Mr. Rencher, that the appellate process is 
19 going to be more expeditious, and that's one of the 
20 places where I think your argument is flawed. We're not 
21 talking about a month or two, given how long it 
22 typically takes them to get to matters, in heavy case 
23 law, etcetera. I think we're talking about six months 
24 and by the time they give it back to counsel we have 
25 lost seven months, eight months, something like that. 
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1 MR. RENCHER: My view is, Your Honor, I don't 
2 see the prejudice because we would still have to have 
3 those issues resolved. 
4 JUDGE LEWIS: Right. Well, I understand your 
5 position. 
6 MR. RENCHER: And I appreciate the Court's 
7 consideration. We'll submit it, Your Honor, and request 
8 that if the Court denies the stay, that it leave its 
9 current order in place as stipulated by the parties. 
10 JUDGE LEWIS: All right. The motion is 
11 denied. The current order remains in place as to the 
12 timing. My objective is not to prejudice anyone, but 
13 rather to try to take into account all sides' equity. 
14 And for that reason, your point about the additional 
15 time, as set forth in the stipulation, seems 
16 appropriate. So that will be ordered. 
17 I appreciate the high quality of the written 
18 briefing in this matter and the oral argument. It's not 
19 I that I didn't hear it, I did, but I took full 
20 opportunity to read everything before I heard argument 
21 today, and then I have listened to argument as well. 
22 And this seems to me to be the appropriate step at this 
23 juncture and I don't think it prejudices anybody's basic 
24 rights. And so that would be the order. 
25 Mr. Parker, may I ask you and Mr. McConkie to 
21 
prepare an order commensurate with what I've just said? 
MR. PARKER: We will, Your Honor. 
JUDGE LEWIS: And taking into account the 
stipulated order and the time set forth in there. 
MR. PARKER: We will. 
JUDGE LEWIS: Let me say one more thing. It's 
always a pleasure to have you here because I know the 
quality of the written product and the oral argument is 
always going to be high. So even though I may not have 
ruled in -- to everyone's satisfaction, I always am 
delighted to have you all here and appreciate the high 
quality and professionalism associated with anything in 
which you participate. 
MR. RENCHER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. PARKER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. RENCHER: May I respond, Your Honor, just 
briefly, with opposing counsel here, that we respect the 
Court. It's always difficult when you're pursuing the 
stays with an obvious appeal pending, the suggestion 
being that there needs to be reconsideration. 
JUDGE LEWIS: I don't take it that way, 
Mr. Rencher. I think you are an advocate, a zealous 
advocate, a fine lawyer, and you have always treated me 
with respect, and I do not view this as in any way 
denigrating that. I think it's an appropriate motion to 
22 
make. It's a well-taken motion. I'm just not granting 
it. 
(Whereupon the Proceedings Concluded.) 
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was given to me to transcribe; 
That the testimony of the witnesses and 
all objections made at the time of the examinations were 
recorded stenographically by me from videotape and were 
thereafter transcribed under my direction, all to the 
best of my skill and ability, given the quality of the 
recording; 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am neither 
counsel for nor related to any party to said action nor 
in anywise interested in the outcome thereof 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my 
name and affixed my seal this 25th day of November, 
2004. 
i /? 
J U V W A J I L \ ttflAC t 3* A ^ * vss**^ 
ROCKIE E. DUSTIN, CSR, RPR 
Notary Public in and for the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
W mam cms asm 
My Commission Expires 
January 26, 2005 
Notary Pubnc""*" " I 
ROCKIEEOUSTIW . 
977 North 100 West 1 
Farmmgton, Utah 84025 
My Commission Expires I 
Januaiy 26,2005 s 
State 6f Utah I 
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OPINIONBY: THOMAS R. PHILLIPS 
OPINION: 1*591] ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS. 
In the workers' compensation suit underlying this orig-
inal mandamus proceeding, the trial court appointed an 
attorney to represent the claimant, ordering the carrier 
to pay opposing counsel's fees as the case progressed. 
While not challenging the appointment itself, the [**2J 
carrier contends that the trial court abused its discretion 
and caused irreparable harm by requiring it to pay for the 
claimant's attorney. Because we agree, we conditionally 
grant the writ of mandamus. 
I 
Real party in interest Allene Reed, a 49 year-old of-
fice administrator, suffered a slip and fall at work while 
moving file boxes. Reed contends that she struck her head 
on the floor during the fall, aggravating a preexisting med-
ical condition referred to as "syrinx condition and symp-
tomatic, previously compensated hydrocephalus" ("hy-
drocephalus"). While the record does not contain a lay 
definition of this condition, it apparently involves abnor-
mal fluid levels in the cranium. 
Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, the 
workers' compensation carrier for Reed's employer, de-
nied that Reed's hydrocephalus, if it existed at all, was 
caused by or aggravated by her fall. After a benefit re-
view conference failed to resolve this issue, the par-
ties proceeded to a contested case hearing. See TEX. 
LAB. CODE § 410.151. Reed was not represented by 
counsel at this hearing, although she was assisted by a 
Workers' Compensation Commission ombudsman. See id. 
§409.041. 
The hearing [**3] officer ruled in favor of Reed, con-
cluding that she suffered from preexisting hydrocephalus 
aggravated by her on-the-job injury. The hearing officer 
further found that Reed had not yet reached maximum 
medical improvement, rejecting the contrary conclusion 
of the designated doctor. Accordingly, the hearing officer 
ordered Travelers to pay temporary income benefits to 
Reed until she reached maximum medical improvement 
or no longer suffered from a disability, as well as medical 
benefits associated with Reed's condition. The record does 
not disclose the amount of the temporary income benefits, 
which are paid weekly at a rate based on the claimant's 
average weekly wage. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 408 103. 
Travelers was apparently still paying these weekly bene-
fits at the time of the trial court proceedings which form 
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the basis of this complaint. 
Travelers appealed to a Commission appeals panel, 
which affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Reed again 
represented herself in this administrative appeal, appar-
ently without assistance from an ombudsman. 
Travelers then filed suit in district court for judicial re-
view of the Commission's decision. See TEX. LAB. CODE 
§ 410.251. Reed, appearing [**4] pro se, hied an answer 
and a counterclaim seeking "weekly indemnity benefits 
for 401 weeks from June 9, 1993; all medical expenses, 
costs of court and general relief." nl A short time later, 
she filed a motion asking the court to appoint an attorney 
for her, to be paid by the county or by Travelers. Reed 
contended that, despite diligent efforts, she had been un-
able to obtain a lawyer to represent her on a contingency 
[*592] basis. She further argued that this inability resulted 
from the fee restrictions imposed by the new Workers' 
Compensation Act, see TEX. LAB. CODE § 408.221, 
which became effective in January 1991. See Acts 1989, 
71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 17.18. Reed contended that 
these restrictions, by depriving her of counsel, violated 
her due course, due process and equal protection rights 
under the Texas and United States Constitutions. She also 
filed an affidavit attesting that she was "too poor to employ 
counsel to represent [her] in this case." 
nl Although the Workers' Compensation 
Commission subsequently intervened in the case 
for the purpose of showing "that the decision of the 
TWCC Appeals Panel is correct and should be up-
held by [the trial court]," see TEX. LAB. CODE § 
410.254, no one representing the Commission has 
yet appeared at any of the trial court hearings. 
1**5] 
Before the district court, Reed presented live testi-
mony from three lawyers who declined to represent her 
because of the fee restrictions and the limitations on total 
recovery for claimants. Two of these lawyers also cited 
the Act's rule prohibiting attorneys from lending money 
to claimants, see TEX. LAB. CODE § 415.007, contend-
ing that this restriction prevented them from adequately 
developing cases because litigation expenses could not 
be advanced. Reed also offered her own testimony that 
several other lawyers had refused to represent her be-
cause they did not accept cases under the new Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
After two hearings, the trial court granted Reed's mo-
tion, appointing attorney Tom Ragland of Waco to rep-
resent her. The court further ordered Travelers to pay 
Ragland's reasonable fees approved by the court, at an 
hourly rate not to exceed $85. Ragland was authorized 
to submit fee statements to the court every thirty days, 
which Travelers was to pay within thirty days after court 
approval of the statements. The court made no provision 
for refund of these fees in the event that Travelers was 
successful in its appeal, nor did it require Reed to bear 
any portion of [**6] the expense out of the weekly ben-
efit checks she was receiving from Travelers. The court 
cited no legal authority in support of its order, nor did 
it hold any provision of the Workers' Compensation Act 
unconstitutional. 
A short time later, Travelers nonsuited its claim for 
judicial review of the Commission's decision. The case re-
mains pending, however, because of Reed's counterclaim 
for long-term indemnity benefits. Although Travelers has 
filed special exceptions contending that this counterclaim 
is not ripe because Reed has not presented it to the 
Commission, the trial court has apparently not yet ruled 
on those special exceptions. 
On September 14, 1995, after the court approved 
Ragland's first fee statement for $1,742, Travelers moved 
for reconsideration of the court's order requiring it to pay 
Ragland's fees. At the hearing on this motion, Travelers 
sought to offer advertisements from the Waco yellow 
pages from several lawyers soliciting workers' compen-
sation cases. The court, refusing to consider this evidence 
because Travelers had not offered it earlier, overruled 
Travelers' motion for reconsideration. 
The parties agreed to stay the trial court's order pend-
ing mandamus review. [**7] After the court of appeals 
denied relief without opinion, Travelers sought relief from 
this Court, and we granted leave to file its petition for writ 
of mandamus. 
II 
Travelers contends that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion by requiring it to pay the fees for Reed's appointed 
counsel. Before addressing this issue, it may be helpful 
to clarify what is not presented for decision in this man-
damus proceeding. Travelers does not here challenge the 
trial court's authority to appoint an attorney for Reed, and 
thus we do not address the propriety of that portion of the 
trial court's order. Moreover, Reed in this Court has aban-
doned her argument that the attorney's fees provisions of 
the Worker's Compensation Act are unconstitutional. We 
are thus not called upon to decide whether Reed's ev-
idence regarding her difficulty in obtaining an attorney 
demonstrates that the Act unreasonably restricts access 
to counsel, see Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n 
v. Garcia, 893 S W2d 504, 533 (Tex. 1995) (facial con-
stitutional violation not established based on anecdotal 
evidence of attorneys no longer accepting cases under 
new Act), or whether any such restriction would entitle 
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Reed to [**8] court-appointed counsel See Lassiter v 
Department of Social Servs 452 US 18 26-27 68 L 
Ed 2d 640, 101 S Ct 2153 (1981) (recognizing [*593] 
piesumption that an indigent litigant has a right to ap-
pointed counsel only where physical liberty is at stake) 
The narrow issue presented is whether the trial court, hav-
ing appointed an attorney to represent Reed, could require 
Travelers to pay the fees for that attorney We conclude 
that placing this burden on Travelers constituted an abuse 
of discretion 
In Texas, attorney's fees may not be recovered from 
an opposing party unless such recovery is piovided for by 
statute or by contract between the parties See Dallas 
Central Appraisal Dist v Seven Investment Co, 835 
S W2d 75 77 (Tex 1992), New Amsterdam Cas Co 
v Texas Indus, 414 S W2d 914, 915 (Tex 1967) The 
authorization of attorney's fees in civil cases may not be 
inferred, rather it "must be provided for by the express 
terms of the statute in question " Fust City Bank-Farmers 
Branch v Guex, 677 SW2d 25, 30 (Tex 1984) 
There is no statute which authorizes recovery of at-
torney's fees under the circumstances of this case To the 
contiary, [**9] the Workers'Compensation Act provides 
that the claimant's attorney's fee "shall be paid from the 
claimant's recovery," TEX LAB CODE § 408 221(b), n2 
with two exceptions, neither of which is present here 
The first exception applies where an insurance carrier 
unsuccessfully challenges a Commission order awarding 
supplemental income benefits See id § 408 147(c) In 
that situation, the claimant is entitled to lecover reason-
able attorney's fees in addition to any acciued benefits 
Id Because there has been no Commission determination 
that Reed is entitled to supplemental income benefits, this 
exception clearly does not apply here The second ex-
ception allows claimants to recover attorney's fees when 
suing to enfoice a final order of the Commission which 
the carrier has failed to comply with See TEX LAB 
CODE § 410 208 Because a Commission older which is 
timely appealed for judicial review is not "final," see id § 
410 205(a), this provision likewise does not apply in this 
case 
n2 This fee must be approved by the 
Commission or court based on such factors as the 
time and labor required, the difficulty of the is-
sues, and the amount in controversy, see TEX LAB 
CODE $ 408 221 (a), (c), and it generally cannot ex-
ceed 25 percent of the claimant's recovery See id 
§408 221(h) 
[*no] 
Reed also does not contend that she may recover at-
torney's fees based on any agreement between the par-
ties Specifically, she does not claim that the workers' 
compensation insurance contract between her employer 
and Travelers authorizes her recovery of attorney's fees 
Indeed, she cannot do so, as section 38 001 of the Texas 
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which generally au-
thorizes recovery of attorney's fees for suits on a written 
contract, does not apply to insurance contracts subject 
to article 2121 of the Texas Insurance Code See TEX 
CIV PRAC & REM CODE § 38 006 The compensation 
policy issued by Travelers falls within this exception See 
Aetna Cas & Sur Co v Marshall, 724 S W2d 770 772 
(Tex 1987) 
Instead, Reed attempts to justify the trial court's order 
under section 24 016 of the Texas Government Code and 
under the trial court's inherent authority We address each 
purported justification 
The Government Code vests district judges with the 
following discretion to appoint counsel 
A district judge may appoint counsel to at-
tend to the cause of a party who makes an 
affidavit that he is too poor to employ coun-
sel to attend to the cause 
TEX [**11] GOV'T CODE §24 016 Whatever the 
reach of this provision, it contains no language autho-
rizing judges to shift the fees for appointed counsel to 
the opposing party, and it has never been so interpreted 
Because the authonty for a fee award "may not be sup-
plied by implication but must be provided for by the ex-
press terms of the statute in question," Guex, 677 S W2d 
at 30, we may not construe section 24 016 as impliedly 
authorizing a trial court to place the financial burden of 
appointed counsel on the opposing party 
The original statutory predecessor to section 24 016 
provided as follows 
The judges in any case, civil or criminal, 
in which a party may swear that he is too 
poor to employ counsel, shall appoint coun-
sel [*594J for such party, who shall attend 
to the cause in behalf of such party without 
any fee or reward 
Act of May 11, 1846, §11, reprinted m 2 H GAMMEL, 
LAWS OF TEXAS 1509 (1898) (emphasis added) 
Because the Legislature subsequently amended the statute 
by deleting the requirement that appointed counsel serve 
without fee or reward, Reed argues that the Legislature 
must have intended to vest distnct judges with the au-
thority to place [**12J the financial burden of appointed 
923 S W2d 590, *594, 1996 Tex LEXIS 63, **12, 
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counsel on the opposing party We disagree It is more 
likely that the Legislature simply wanted to remove any 
impediment to appointed counsel receiving attorney's fees 
from some other source, e g , from the indigent claimant's 
recovery, from local or state government, or from the op-
posing party if independently authorized by agreement or 
some other fee-shifting statute Had the Legislatuie in-
tended to authonze the shifting of attorney's fees to the 
opposing party under section 24 016 or its piecursors, 
we believe it would have expressly said so See Guex 
677 S W2dat 30 ("If the legislatuie had intended recov-
ery of attorney's fees under [section 9 507(a) of the Texas 
Business and Commerce Code], they would no doubt have 
provided for it ") 
Reed next contends that, even if the trial court 
lacked statutory authority to impose attorney's fees against 
Travelers, it had inherent authority to do so A trial court 
has certain inherent power derived "from the very fact that 
the court has been cieated and charged by the constitution 
with certain duties and responsibilities " Eichelbergei v 
Eichelbeigei 582 SW2d395 398 (Tex 1979) 1**131 A 
couit may call upon its inheient poweis "to aid in the ex-
el cise of its junsdiction, in the administration of justice, 
and in the pieservation of its independence and integrity " 
Id 
While a court has the duty to ensure that "judicial pro-
ceedings remain truly adversary in nature," Public Utility 
Comm'n v Cofer 754 S W2d 121 124 (Tex 1988) we 
have never held that a civil litigant must be represented 
by counsel in older for a court to carry on its essential, 
constitutional function Cf Lassiter 452 US at 26-27 
Indeed, thousands of cases each year are prosecuted in our 
courts by pro se litigants Nevertheless, we lecognize that 
in some exceptional cases the public and private interests 
at stake are such that the administration of justice may best 
be served by appointing a lawyer to lepresent an indigent 
civil litigant But because Tiavelers does not challenge 
Ragland's appointment, we need not decide whether the 
trial court had inherent authority in this case to appoint 
an attorney Moreover, even if Travelers had challenged 
Ragland's appointment, it would not be necessary to ad-
dress the issue under the trial court's inherent authority, 
as section 24 016 [**14] expressly grants district judges 
disci etion to appoint counsel for indigent litigants 
Whatever the extent of the trial court's inherent au-
thority, however, it does not extend to requiring Traveleis 
to pay Ragland's fees Theie is no indication in the lecord 
before us that the tual couit could only have earned out 
its constitutional function by imposing this fee buiden on 
Travelers In the absence of such a showing, allowing tual 
courts to exercise this power under the guise of "inheient 
authority" would constitute a judicial end-run around the 
statutory fee-shifting scheme We therefore reject Reed's 
argument that the trial court had inherent authority for its 
actions 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion by requiring Travelers to pay the fees 
of Reed's appointed counsel 
III 
To be entitled to mandamus relief, Travelers must also 
demonstrate that it has no adequate remedy by appeal 
See Walker v Packer 827 S W2d 833 842 (Tex 1992) 
Travelers does not dispute that it may challenge the trial 
court's order on regular appeal and, if successful, that it 
will obtain the right to recover the disputed attorney's fees 
While [**15] there is no guarantee that Travelers will ac-
tually be able to collect the fees, this uncertainty in and of 
itself does not render the appellate remedy inadequate In 
Street v Second Court of Appeals 715 S W2d 638 639-
40 (Tex 1986) for example, where the tual couit assessed 
attorney's fees as a discovery [*595] sanction, we held 
that an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because 
of the uncertainty of recovery on appeal 
The piesent case is different, however The trial court 
did not merely require Travelers to pay an isolated at-
torney's fee as a sanction Rather, it required Travelers 
to fund, on a monthly basis, all of Reed's attorney's fees 
throughout the litigation Requiring a party to advance 
the litigation costs of the opposition in addition to its own 
expenses so skews the litigation process that any subse-
quent remedy by appeal is inadequate The party receiv-
ing a "free ride" under such an order has little incentive 
to resolve the dispute economically and efficiently, and 
may even be encouraged to deliberately protract the pro-
ceedings to encourage a favorable settlement Further, the 
litigation strategy of the party bearing the expenses will 
be unfairly |**16] hindered, knowing that at each step, 
whether it be trial, a hearing, a deposition, or the issuance 
of written discovery, it must bear the expenses of both 
sides n3 
n3 We emphasize that we are articulating gen-
eral policy concerns, and that we have no reason to 
believe that Mr Ragland would engage in bad faith 
or abusive litigation tactics 
We have recognized that, in the discovery context, 
remedy by appeal will be inadequate where the ti lal court's 
eiTor vitiates or severely compromises a party's ability to 
present a viable claim or defense See Walker 827 S W2d 
at 843 While the trial court's error in this case does not 
affect Travelers' ability to present the substance of its 
defense, it radically skews the procedural dynamics of 
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the case. Under these unusual circumstances, the rem-
edy by regular appeal is inadequate. See Transamerican 
Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W2d 913, 919 (Tex. 
1991) (eventual remedy by appeal from trial court's inter-
locutory order imposing death penalty sanction is [**17] 
inadequate because "the entire conduct of the litigation is 
skewed" by the imposition of the sanction). 
For the foregoing reasons, we conditionally grant the 
writ of mandamus. The trial court is directed to vacate 
that portion of its order requiring Travelers to bear the 
expense of Reed's appointed lawyer. 
Thomas R. Phillips 
Chief Justice 
Opinion Delivered: May 31, 1996 
DISSENTBY: James A. Baker 
DISSENT: 
I respectfully dissent. 
Once again, the Court ignores previously well-
established mandamus standards and awards extraordi-
nary relief because it simply disagrees with the trial court's 
ruling. I agree with the Court that the trial court abused 
its discretion, but ordinary appeal provides Travelers an 
adequate remedy. 
lowing mandamus relief absent a showing by the rela-
tor that ordinary appeal was not adequate to correct a 
trial court's abuse of discretion. See Walker v. Packer, 
827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. /^ (d isapproving Barker 
v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977) and Allen v. 
Humphreys, 559 S. W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977) along with "any 
other authorities to the extent they might be read as abol-
ishing [**18] or relaxing this rule."). In Walker, the Court 
called the policy allowing mandamus only where there is 
no adequate remedy by appeal "sound" policy. Walker, 
827 S. W.2d at 842. Indeed, it is sound policy. We should 
uphold the policy, not just recite it. 
Here, the Court purports to abide by Walker's man-
date. However, in its rush to remedy the trial court's 
wrong, the Court ignores the Walker standard. I find 
this unfortunate. The Court should adhere to basic princi-
ples of stare decisis and hold that Travelers must, as any 
other party seeking mandamus relief, "demonstrate that 
the remedy offered by ordinary appeal is inade-quate." 
Walker, 827 S.W2d at 842. Travelers has not met this 
standard. In fact, Travelers "does not dispute that it may 
challenge the trial court's order on regular appeal." 
S.W.2d at . Instead, Travelers, like this Court, simply 
thinks the trial court acted outside its discretion and that 
a quick fix is deserved. This is not enough for mandamus. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
James A. Baker, Justice 
In 1992, this Court specifically disapproved cases al- OPINION DELIVERED: May 31, 1996 
